“Digital sovereignty” has become a buzzword in digital policies. Contrary to the imaginary of digital transformation as preceding an era of limitless global networking in the 1990s, approaches to state regulation and delimitation of data flows as well as programmes for national digital infrastructures are justified with calls for digital sovereignty across very different contexts. This forum brings together contributions from political geography, law, computer science, and ethics that compare and analyse discourses and practices of digital sovereignty. The case studies on Russia and the EU reveal parallels as well as fundamental differences in the conception and implementation of digital sovereignty. Essays on the challenges posed by new forms of cross-border interaction (such as cloud computing) and new actors (such as digital platforms) illustrate that the traditional coupling of concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and the state, of jurisdiction and borders, must be rethought. The essays in this forum thus make it clear that the digital transformation is not simply a socio-technical modernisation process. It is rather shaped in specific ways and should be understood and analysed as (geo)-political discourses and practices. The forum contributes to the development of a political digital geography that analyses how the digital transformation is contested and produced in specific ways and unearths the politics and spatialities conceived and produced in these discourses and practices.
La croissance exponentielle de l’Internet a révolutionné nos modes de vie, bouleversé notre économie, démultiplié nos moyens de communication mais aussi conduit à une prolifération des conflits entre une multitude d’acteurs à propos de son contrôle et sa régulation ; de l’utilisation des réseaux informatiques dans le cadre de conflits politiques, de combats militaires, de guerre économique, de renseignement ou de politique d’influence diplomatique et culturelle ; et du respect de la vie privée et autres libertés individuelles. Le cyberespace est ainsi devenu à la fois un enjeu de rivalités de pouvoir entre acteurs, un théâtre d’affrontement et une arme redoutable dans les conflits géopolitiques. Pendant longtemps, ces questions sont restées entre les mains d’une petite communauté d’experts de culture scientifique et technique. Les gouvernements, les militaires, les entreprises, les citoyens ont désormais besoin de mieux comprendre les enjeux parce que beaucoup de ces décisions techniques sont devenues politiques et stratégiques. La géopolitique est un outil indispensable pour les analyser.
In November 2019, in the wake of political demonstrations against the regime, Iran managed to selectively cut off most traffic from the global Internet while fully operating its own domestic network. It seemingly confirmed the main hypothesis our research had led us to, based on prior observation of data routing: Iran’s architecture of connectivity enables selective censorship of international traffic. This paper examines, through the case of Iran, how states can leverage the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) as a tool of geopolitical control and what are the trade-offs they face. This question raises a methodological question that we also address: how the analysis of BGP can infer and document these strategies of territorialization of cyberspace. The Internet is a network of networks where each network is an autonomous system. Autonomous systems (ASes) are independent administrative entities controlled by a variety of actors such as governments, companies and universities. Their administrators have to agree and communicate on the path followed by packets travelling across the Internet, which is made possible by BGP. Agreements between ASes are often confidential but BGP requires neighbouring ASes to interact with each other in order to coordinate routing through the constant release of connectivity update messages. These messages announce the availability (or withdrawal) of a sequence of ASes that can be followed to reach an IP address prefix. In our study, we inferred the structure of Iran's connectivity through the capture and analysis of these BGP announcements. We show how the particularities of Iran's BGP and connectivity structure can enable active measures, such as censorship, both internally and externally throughout the network. We argue that Iran has found a way to reconcile a priori conflicting strategic goals: developing a self-sustaining and resilient domestic Internet, but with tight control at its borders. It thus enables the regime to leverage connectivity as a tool of censorship in the face of social instability and as a tool of regional influence in the context of strategic competition.
Cet article propose une première approche du concept de datasphère comme un nouvel espace à appréhender et un nouveau champ d’étude pour la géographie. La notion de Datasphère, tout juste émergente, permet d’englober dans un même concept les enjeux stratégiques liés au cyberespace mais aussi à la géographie des flux et la maîtrise des données, la compréhension de l’espace informationnel, la cartographie des réseaux topologiques, la fusion de données géolocalisées et non spatialisées. Elle implique la compréhension de la datasphère comme un construit social reflétant des enjeux de pouvoirs et des choix politiques, sociaux, techniques et organisationnels qui ont des implications stratégiques. La démarche géopolitique est essentielle à la compréhension de ce nouvel environnement qui, s’il ne correspond pas à un territoire au sens classique en géographie, est le produit, l’enjeu et le vecteur de rapports de pouvoir, au cœur des conflits géopolitiques contemporains et de la diplomatie internationale.
Cyberspace has completely revolutionised our ways of life, disrupted our economies, and allowed for important progress in our societies. But the advantages of the digital revolution are now threatened by the use of cyberspace for war purposes. This article explores the states’ security dilemma as they face cyber challenges and the ambivalence of the notion of security in cyberspace. It highlights how, in ten years, cyberspace has become a battlefield and a strategic priority for many states that have represented it as a geopolitical threat for their national security, hence justifying its progressive militarisation. Meanwhile, they have become cognizant to the systemic risk of proliferation of offensive cybertools and cyber-operations. This security dilemma – one that opposes a representation of cyber threats as a geopolitical risk to that of cyberspace as a systemic risk – is at the heart of the multilateral negotiations on the regulation of cyberspace. There, a multiplicity of non-state actors has forced their way to the table through a multitude of initiatives that emphasize the importance of the challenges at stake and how difficult it will be for the states to face them.
16 December 2022 in Territory, Politics, Governance
In the second half of the 2010s, the Arabian Peninsula experienced major foreign policy changes that suggested a reshuffling of the region as a security complex. This paper offers an analysis of the geography of Internet data routing in the Middle East in order to assess whether foreign policy shifts apply to cyberspace and the potential for meaningful cybersecurity cooperation. We specifically focus on the Qatar blockade and the Abraham agreements. Our main hypothesis is that the architecture of connectivity can reveal the level of existing cooperation between data-routing operators of different countries and can therefore serve as one among many indicators for the level of trust (or lack thereof) between these countries and, as a result, for the potential success of cyber cooperation. We argue that the architecture of connectivity only partially reflects foreign policy shifts in the Gulf Region and despite the political announcements, digital borders and rivalries in the region remain deep and could potentially create obstacles for meaningful cybersecurity cooperation.