This paper takes a stance in the debate concerning scientific understanding. It claims that the case for a specific type of understanding, understanding without explanation (UwE), is still open, despite the tendency in the current literature that might suggest otherwise. The paper begins by situating the distinction between an explanatory and non-explanatory understanding in the debate on understanding by introducing Lipton’s account of UwE. The paper then discusses the significance of Lipton’s proposals for the debate and argues that Kelp’s interpretation does not exhaust the challenge they pose to any theory of understanding. The paper then examines the best articulated critique of Lipton’s account provided by Khalifa and rejects it as inadequate. It ends by sketching out a list of positive reasons that support the continued examination of UwE.
The present chapter aims to reject a bold critique raised against understanding without explanation (UwE). It begins by reviewing the way UwE was reflected during the last two decades of the debate on understanding. It continues by introducing Lipton’s account of UwE and the general lines along which Khalifa articulates his critique of UwE. The critique is rejected in two ways. First, it discloses Khalifa’s incorrect reconstruction of Lipton’s basic assumptions and argument. The second challenge rejects the more general argumentative strategy deployed by Khalifa in dealing with UwE cases in showing that the explanatory sort of understanding always surpasses the non-explanatory form. The case of UwE through merely potential explanation will be used to exemplify the argument. <!----> <!----> <!----> <!---->