The peak-end rule predicts that retrospective evaluations of affective events heavily depend on their most intense and last moment and imply duration neglect. It was originally proposed for negative experiences such as painful medical procedures. It is unclear, however, to what degree it also applies to positive experiences. Previously, rigorous comparisons between the two domains were limited due to the use of qualitatively different stimuli. Hence, it is not clear if the peak-end rule holds for short positive and negative experiences alike. To address these questions in a genuinely emotional domain, we conducted two experiments (n = 48 each) in which we used odours as stimuli. Participants repeatedly evaluated continuous odour sequences delivered into their noses via an olfactometer. The sequences differed in valence (positive vs. negative), length (36 vs. 72 s), and trajectory (increasing, decreasing, U-shaped, and inverse U-shaped). Results provide evidence for the peak-end rule for both positive and negative experiences alike. Results further show an overweighting of intense negative experiences for sequences that contain both pleasant and unpleasant episodes but provide little evidence for an effect of the trajectory manipulation.
The goal of this study was to identify and empirically test variables that indicate how well partners in relationships know each other's food preferences. Participants (n = 2,854) lived in the same household and were part of a large, nationally representative panel study in Germany. Each partner independently predicted the other's preferences for several common food items. Results show that predictive accuracy was higher for likes and for extreme and stereotypical preferences as compared to dislikes and for moderate and idiosyncratic preferences. Accuracy was also higher for couples with a high similarity in preferences and with longer relationship duration but was independent of participants' age after controlling for relationship duration. The data also show that relationship duration was accompanied by higher similarity in couples' food preferences. There was a small positive correlation between partner knowledge and both partner similarity and satisfaction with family life, but no correlation between partner knowledge and general life satisfaction. The results reconcile both valence and base-rate accounts of preference prediction accuracy.
In clinical trials, incentivizing human research subjects with large amounts of money is often considered unethical, as it may coerce people to participate. This argument implies that people perceive rewards (i.e., incentives) independently of risks (i.e., probability of side-effects) or that they assume that larger rewards are associated with lower risks. However, past research on risk perception indicates that people associate higher rewards with higher risks. To test whether people treat incentives in clinical trials as a proxy for risk, we conducted an online experiment (N = 483) in which people estimated the riskiness of hypothetical clinical trials. We manipulated the monetary incentives that participants of the clinical trials were offered. The results show that people expect more side effects if the monetary incentives for participation are higher. Results further show that the majority of participants were more likely to ethically approve a trial if it offered a high monetary incentive. In contrast to existing ethical guidelines these results suggest that paying large rewards may be less problematic because people implicitly associate them with higher risk and because they trade-off risks and financial benefits.