Esma Koca

Esma Koca

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Esma Koca

Imperial Business School, Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 August 2021 in Nature Computational Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JDJosh C. D’aEth
Josh C. D’aEth
SGShubhechyya Ghosal
Shubhechyya Ghosal
FGFiona Grimm
Fiona Grimm
DHDavid Haw
David Haw
EKEsma Koca
Esma Koca
MMMarisa Miraldo
Marisa Miraldo
In response to unprecedented surges in the demand for hospital care during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, health systems have prioritized patients with COVID-19 to life-saving hospital care to the detriment of other patients. In contrast to these ad hoc policies, we develop a linear programming framework to optimally schedule elective procedures and allocate hospital beds among all planned and emergency patients to minimize years of life lost. Leveraging a large dataset of administrative patient medical records, we apply our framework to the National Health Service in England and show that an extra 50,750–5,891,608 years of life can be gained compared with prioritization policies that reflect those implemented during the pandemic. Notable health gains are observed for neoplasms, diseases of the digestive system, and injuries and poisoning. Our open-source framework provides a computationally efficient approximation of a large-scale discrete optimization problem that can be applied globally to support national-level care prioritization policies.

1 October 2023 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JDJosh C. D’aEth
Josh C. D’aEth
SGShubhechyya Ghosal
Shubhechyya Ghosal
FGFiona Grimm
Fiona Grimm
DHDavid Haw
David Haw
EKEsma Koca
Esma Koca
WWWolfram Wiesemann
Wolfram Wiesemann
The COVID-19 pandemic has seen dramatic demand surges for hospital care that have placed a severe strain on health systems worldwide. As a result, policy makers are faced with the challenge of managing scarce hospital capacity to reduce the backlog of non-COVID patients while maintaining the ability to respond to any potential future increases in demand for COVID care. In this paper, we propose a nationwide prioritization scheme that models each individual patient as a dynamic program whose states encode the patient’s health and treatment condition, whose actions describe the available treatment options, whose transition probabilities characterize the stochastic evolution of the patient’s health, and whose rewards encode the contribution to the overall objectives of the health system. The individual patients’ dynamic programs are coupled through constraints on the available resources, such as hospital beds, doctors, and nurses. We show that the overall problem can be modeled as a grouped weakly coupled dynamic program for which we determine near-optimal solutions through a fluid approximation. Our case study for the National Health Service in England shows how years of life can be gained by prioritizing specific disease types over COVID patients, such as injury and poisoning, diseases of the respiratory system, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the digestive system, and cancer. This paper was accepted by Chung-Piaw Teo, optimization. Funding: G. Forchini acknowledges funding from Jan Wallanders and Tom Hedelius Foundation and the Tore Browaldh Foundation, funding from MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis [Reference MR/R015600/1], jointly funded by the UK Medical Research Council (MRC) and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), under the MRC/FCDO Concordat agreement, part of the EDCTP2 program supported by the European Union; and acknowledges funding by Community Jameel. D. Rizmie acknowledges partial funding from the MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis [Reference MR/R015600/1]. J. C. D’Aeth acknowledges funding from the Wellcome Trust [Reference 102169/Z/13/Z]. S. Moret acknowledges partial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) under [Grant P2ELP2_188028]. S. Ghosal was funded by the Imperial College President’s PhD Scholarship. F. Grimm was funded by the Health Foundation as part of core staff member activity. This research was funded in whole, or in part, by the Wellcome Trust [Grant 102169/Z/13/Z]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4679 .

1 June 2026 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MHMushegh Harutyunyan
Mushegh Harutyunyan
EKEsma Koca
Esma Koca
In player-versus-player video games, players’ natural desire to win and avoid losing has created an opportunity for game developers to sell “pay-to-win” add-ons, digital items that give buyers a competitive advantage against other players. In this paper, we investigate the pricing and design of a pay-to-win add-on, its effect on the base game, and profit implications for the developer. When a large share of the players are less price sensitive and highly willing to buy the pay-to-win add-on, we find that, surprisingly, the developer may prefer not to introduce it. Further, when it is optimal to sell the add-on, the developer designs it to be less (more) powerful in games where players are highly (moderately) sensitive to losing. In practice, the developer may design rewards or penalties in the game to influence players’ sensitivities to winning and losing, respectively. Our findings suggest that when selling a pay-to-win add-on, the developer ideally prefers players’ loss sensitivity to be neither too high nor too low, whereas high win sensitivity tends to benefit the developer. The introduction of a pay-to-win add-on influences the optimal pricing and design of the base game. In particular, the developer decreases the base game price and may even sell it as a freemium. Despite the price reduction, investment in game quality may actually increase. From the players’ perspective, our analysis shows that the introduction of a pay-to-win add-on can actually improve player surplus. In an extension of our core model, we show that the developer may prefer to customize player-to-player matching probabilities based on ownership of the pay-to-win add-on, making players who own it more likely to be matched against nonowners. However, such customization is not always optimal, and under some market conditions, the developer may optimally abstain from customizing matching probabilities. In another extension, we show that the developer may benefit from setting a negative price for the base game; counterintuitively, player surplus does not increase from negative pricing. This paper was accepted by Raphael Thomadsen, marketing. Supplemental Material: The web appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04610 .