Ziad Ismail

Ziad Ismail

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Ziad Ismail

Télécom ParisTech, Université Paris-Saclay

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 August 2018 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CKChristophe Kiennert
Christophe Kiennert
ZIZiad Ismail
Ziad Ismail
HDHerve Debar
Herve Debar
JLJean Leneutre
Jean Leneutre
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are key components for securing critical infrastructures, capable of detecting malicious activities on networks or hosts. However, the efficiency of an IDS depends primarily on both its configuration and its precision. The large amount of network traffic that needs to be analyzed, in addition to the increase in attacks’ sophistication, renders the optimization of intrusion detection an important requirement for infrastructure security, and a very active research subject. In the state of the art, a number of approaches have been proposed to improve the efficiency of intrusion detection and response systems. In this article, we review the works relying on decision-making techniques focused on game theory and Markov decision processes to analyze the interactions between the attacker and the defender, and classify them according to the type of the optimization problem they address. While these works provide valuable insights for decision-making, we discuss the limitations of these solutions as a whole, in particular regarding the hypotheses in the models and the validation methods. We also propose future research directions to improve the integration of game-theoretic approaches into IDS optimization techniques.

19 June 2014 in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZIZiad Ismail
Ziad Ismail
JLJean Leneutre
Jean Leneutre
DBDavid Bateman
David Bateman
Lin ChenLin Chen
Lin Chen
The widespread deployment of smart meters in the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) raises privacy concerns. Analyzing the data collected from smart meters can expose habits and can be potentially used to predict consumers' behaviors. In this paper, we analyze the confidentiality of information in the AMI consisting of nodes with interdependent correlated security assets. On each node, the defender can choose one of several security modes available. We try to answer the following questions: 1) What is the expected behavior of a rational attacker?; 2) What is the optimal strategy of the defender?; and 3) Can we configure the security modes on each node to discourage the attacker from launching any attacks? In this paper, we formulate the problem as a noncooperative game and analyze the behavior of the attacker and the defender at the Nash equilibrium. The attacker chooses his targets in order to collect the maximum amount of data on consumers, and the defender chooses the encryption level of outbound data on each device in the AMI. Using our model, we derive the minimum defense resources required and the optimal strategy of the defender. Finally, we show how our framework can be applied in a real-world scenario via a case study.

31 March 2016 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZIZiad Ismail
Ziad Ismail
CKChristophe Kiennert
Christophe Kiennert
JLJean Leneutre
Jean Leneutre
Lin ChenLin Chen
Lin Chen
The new developments in cloud computing have introduced significant security challenges to guarantee the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of outsourced data. A service level agreement (SLA) is usually signed between the cloud provider (CP) and the customer. For redundancy purposes, it is important to verify the CP's compliance with data backup requirements in the SLA. There exist a number of security mechanisms to check the integrity and availability of outsourced data. This task can be performed by the customer or be delegated to an independent entity that we will refer to as the verifier. However, checking the availability of data introduces extra costs, which can discourage the customer of performing data verification too often. The interaction between the verifier and the CP can be captured using game theory in order to find an optimal data verification strategy. In this paper, we formulate this problem as a two player non-cooperative game. We consider the case in which each type of data is replicated a number of times, which can depend on a set of parameters including, among others, its size and sensitivity. We analyze the strategies of the CP and the verifier at the Nash equilibrium and derive the expected behavior of both the players. Finally, we validate our model numerically on a case study and explain how we evaluate the parameters in the model.

5 October 2016
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
ZIZiad Ismail
Ziad Ismail
JLJean Leneutre
Jean Leneutre
DBDavid Bateman
David Bateman
Lin ChenLin Chen
Lin Chen

4 October 2017
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
ZIZiad Ismail
Ziad Ismail
CKChristophe Kiennert
Christophe Kiennert
JLJean Leneutre
Jean Leneutre
LCLin Chen
Lin Chen

18 June 2016 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
ZIZiad Ismail
Ziad Ismail
JLJean Leneutre
Jean Leneutre
AFAlia Fourati
Alia Fourati