Maximilian A. Primbs

Maximilian A. Primbs

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Maximilian A. Primbs

Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 August 2021 in Nature Human Behaviour
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Journal Article
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KWKe Wang
Ke Wang
AGAmit Goldenberg
Amit Goldenberg
CDCharles A. Dorison
Charles A. Dorison
JMJeremy K. Miller
Jeremy K. Miller
AUAndero Uusberg
Andero Uusberg
HMHannah Moshontz
Hannah Moshontz

20 September 2022 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MPMaximilian A. Primbs
Maximilian A. Primbs
CPCharlotte R. Pennington
Charlotte R. Pennington
DLDaniël Lakens
Daniël Lakens
MSMiguel Alejandro A. Silan
Miguel Alejandro A. Silan
DLDwayne S. N. Lieck
Dwayne S. N. Lieck
SWSamuel James Westwood
Samuel James Westwood
In the January 2022 issue of Perspectives, Götz et al. argued that small effects are “the indispensable foundation for a cumulative psychological science.” They supported their argument by claiming that (a) psychology, like genetics, consists of complex phenomena explained by additive small effects; (b) psychological-research culture rewards large effects, which means small effects are being ignored; and (c) small effects become meaningful at scale and over time. We rebut these claims with three objections: First, the analogy between genetics and psychology is misleading; second, p values are the main currency for publication in psychology, meaning that any biases in the literature are (currently) caused by pressure to publish statistically significant results and not large effects; and third, claims regarding small effects as important and consequential must be supported by empirical evidence or, at least, a falsifiable line of reasoning. If accepted uncritically, we believe the arguments of Götz et al. could be used as a blanket justification for the importance of any and all “small” effects, thereby undermining best practices in effect-size interpretation. We end with guidance on evaluating effect sizes in relative, not absolute, terms.

14 April 2022 in Nature Human Behaviour
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BBBence Bago
Bence Bago
MKMarton Kovacs
Marton Kovacs
JPJohn Protzko
John Protzko
TNTamas Nagy
Tamas Nagy
ZKZoltan Kekecs
Zoltan Kekecs
BABalazs Aczel
Balazs Aczel

5 March 2021 in PLOS ONE
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JMJonathon McPhetres
Jonathon McPhetres
NANihan Albayrak-Aydemir
Nihan Albayrak-Aydemir
AMAna Barbosa Mendes
Ana Barbosa Mendes
ECElvina C. Chow
Elvina C. Chow
PGPatricio Gonzalez-Marquez
Patricio Gonzalez-Marquez
KVKirill Volodko
Kirill Volodko
The dominant belief is that science progresses by testing theories and moving towards theoretical consensus. While it’s implicitly assumed that psychology operates in this manner, critical discussions claim that the field suffers from a lack of cumulative theory. To examine this paradox, we analysed research published in Psychological Science from 2009–2019 (N = 2,225). We found mention of 359 theories in-text, most were referred to only once. Only 53.66% of all manuscripts included the word theory, and only 15.33% explicitly claimed to test predictions derived from theories. We interpret this to suggest that the majority of research published in this flagship journal is not driven by theory, nor can it be contributing to cumulative theory building. These data provide insight into the kinds of research psychologists are conducting and raises questions about the role of theory in the psychological sciences.

7 December 2023 in Cortex
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HLHannah D. Loenneker
Hannah D. Loenneker
EBErin M. Buchanan
Erin M. Buchanan
AMAna Martinovici
Ana Martinovici
MPMaximilian A. Primbs
Maximilian A. Primbs
MEMahmoud M. Elsherif
Mahmoud M. Elsherif
EPEkaterina Pronizius
Ekaterina Pronizius
In behavioral, cognitive, and social sciences, reaction time measures are an important source of information. However, analyses on reaction time data are affected by researchers' analytical choices and the order in which these choices are applied. The results of a systematic literature review, presented in this paper, revealed that the justification for and order in which analytical choices are conducted are rarely reported, leading to difficulty in reproducing results and interpreting mixed findings. To address this methodological shortcoming, we created a checklist on reporting reaction time pre-processing to make these decisions more explicit, improve transparency, and thus, promote best practices within the field. The importance of the pre-processing checklist was additionally supported by an expert consensus survey and a multiverse analysis. Consequently, we appeal for maximal transparency on all methods applied and offer a checklist to improve replicability and reproducibility of studies that use reaction time measures.

11 September 2024 in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
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Journal Article
Open access
MPMaximilian A. Primbs
Maximilian A. Primbs
RHRob W. Holland
Rob W. Holland
FMFreek Oude Maatman
Freek Oude Maatman
TLTessa A. M. Lansu
Tessa A. M. Lansu
Ruddy FaureRuddy Faure
Ruddy Faure
GBGijsbert Bijlstra
Gijsbert Bijlstra
The 2020 Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests in response to the murder of George Floyd highlighted the lingering structural inequalities faced by Black people in the United States. In the present research, we investigated whether these protests led to reduced implicit and explicit racial bias among White U.S. Americans. Combining data from Project Implicit, Armed Conflict Location Event Data Project (ACLED), Google Trends, and the American Community survey, we observed rapid drops in implicit and explicit measures of racial bias after the onset of the protests. However, both types of racial bias slowly increased again over time as (attention to) BLM faded. We use directed acyclic graphs to show under which assumptions causal inferences are warranted. We discuss our results in light of situational models of bias, their implications for protest movements, and raise questions about when and how social norms play a role in large-scale attitude change.