Nuthan Munaiah

Nuthan Munaiah

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Nuthan Munaiah

Department of Software Engineering, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, New York, United States of America

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 April 2017 in Empirical Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
NMNuthan Munaiah
Nuthan Munaiah
SKSteven Kroh
Steven Kroh
CCCraig Cabrey
Craig Cabrey
MNMeiyappan Nagappan
Meiyappan Nagappan

13 November 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
NMNuthan Munaiah
Nuthan Munaiah
AMAndrew Meneely
Andrew Meneely
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is the de facto standard for vulnerability severity measurement today and is crucial in the analytics driving software fortification. Required by the U.S. National Vulnerability Database, over 75,000 vulnerabilities have been scored using CVSS. We compare how the CVSS correlates with another, closely-related measure of security impact: bounties. Recent economic studies of vulnerability disclosure processes show a clear relationship between black market value and bounty payments. We analyzed the CVSS scores and bounty awarded for 703 vulnerabilities across 24 products. We found a weak (Spearman’s ρ = 0.34) correlation between CVSS scores and bounties, with CVSS being more likely to underestimate bounty. We believe such a negative result is a cause for concern. We investigated why these measurements were so discordant by (a) analyzing the individual questions of CVSS with respect to bounties and (b) conducting a qualitative study to find the similarities and differences between CVSS and the publicly-available criteria for awarding bounties. Among our findings were that the bounty criteria were more explicit about code execution and privilege escalation whereas CVSS makes no explicit mention of those. We also found that bounty valuations are evaluated solely by project maintainers, whereas CVSS has little provenance in practice.

18 August 2016 in Empirical Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
NMNuthan Munaiah
Nuthan Munaiah
FCFelivel Camilo
Felivel Camilo
WWWesley Wigham
Wesley Wigham
AMAndrew Meneely
Andrew Meneely
MNMeiyappan Nagappan
Meiyappan Nagappan

14 November 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
IMIván Tactuk Mercado
Iván Tactuk Mercado
NMNuthan Munaiah
Nuthan Munaiah
AMAndrew Meneely
Andrew Meneely
Mobile app developers today have a hard decision to make: to independently develop native apps for different operating systems or to develop an app that is cross-platform compatible. The availability of different tools and approaches to support cross-platform app development only makes the decision harder. In this study, we used user reviews of apps to empirically understand the relationship (if any) between the approach used in the development of an app and its perceived quality. We used Natural Language Processing (NLP) models to classify 787,228 user reviews of the Android version and iOS version of 50 apps as complaints in one of four quality concerns: performance, usability, security, and reliability. We found that hybrid apps (on both Android and iOS platforms) tend to be more prone to user complaints than interpreted/generated apps. In a study of Facebook, an app that underwent a change in development approach from hybrid to native, we found that change in the development approach was accompanied by a reduction in user complaints about performance and reliability.

28 October 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
NMNuthan Munaiah
Nuthan Munaiah
AMAndrew Meneely
Andrew Meneely
When reasoning about software security, researchers and practitioners use the phrase ``attack surface'' as a metaphor for risk. Enumerate and minimize the ways attackers can break in then risk is reduced and the system is better protected, the metaphor says. But software systems are much more complicated than their surfaces. We propose function- and file-level attack surface metrics---proximity and risky walk---that enable fine-grained risk assessment. Our risky walk metric is highly configurable: we use PageRank on a probability-weighted call graph to simulate attacker behavior of finding or exploiting a vulnerability. We provide evidence-based guidance for deploying these metrics, including an extensive parameter tuning study. We conducted an empirical study on two large open source projects, FFmpeg and Wireshark, to investigate the potential correlation between our metrics and historical post-release vulnerabilities. We found our metrics to be statistically significantly associated with vulnerable functions/files with a small-to-large Cohen's d effect size. Our prediction model achieved an increase of 36% (in FFmpeg) and 27% (in Wireshark) in the average value of F{2}-measure over a base model built with SLOC and coupling metrics. Our prediction model outperformed comparable models from prior literature with notable improvements: 58% reduction in false negative rate, 81% reduction in false positive rate, and 548% increase in F{2}-measure. These metrics advance vulnerability prevention by [(a)] being flexible in terms of granularity, performing better than vulnerability prediction literature, and being tunable so that practitioners can tailor the metrics to their products and better assess security risk.

24 June 2017
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
NMNuthan Munaiah
Nuthan Munaiah
BMBenjamin S. Meyers
Benjamin S. Meyers
CACecilia O. Alm
Cecilia O. Alm
AMAndrew Meneely
Andrew Meneely
PMPradeep K. Murukannaiah
Pradeep K. Murukannaiah
YYYang Yu
Yang Yu