Stephan Lothar Thomsen

Stephan Lothar Thomsen

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Stephan Lothar Thomsen

Institute of Economic Policy, Leibniz University Hannover, Hannover, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2009 in Labour Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AAAlisher Aldashev
Alisher Aldashev
JGJohannes Gernandt
Johannes Gernandt
STStephan L. Thomsen
Stephan L. Thomsen

1 December 2004 in Research in Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RHReinhard Hujer
Reinhard Hujer
MCMarco Caliendo
Marco Caliendo
STStephan L. Thomsen
Stephan L. Thomsen

1 June 2006 in Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RHReinhard Hujer
Reinhard Hujer
STStephan L. Thomsen
Stephan L. Thomsen
CZChristopher Zeiss
Christopher Zeiss

1 October 2019 in Economics of Education Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JRJens Ruhose
Jens Ruhose
STStephan L. Thomsen
Stephan L. Thomsen
IWInsa Weilage
Insa Weilage

8 October 2014 in IZA Journal of Labor Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
BBBernhard Boockmann
Bernhard Boockmann
STStephan L. Thomsen
Stephan L. Thomsen
TWThomas Walter
Thomas Walter
In Germany, imposition of benefit cuts for non-compliant welfare recipients depends on the policy of the local welfare agencies resulting in considerable regional variation, expressed in milder and stricter sanction regimes. Findings from international studies show, that benefit sanctions can substantially increase individual employment uptake. This raises the question, whether a stricter use of sanctions will be effective in Germany. We analyze this question by exploiting the variation of regional sanction regimes as instrumental variables to estimate the LATE of sanctions on the individual employment probability. A tighter sanction policy can be quite effective for non-compliant welfare recipients. JEL codes I38; J64; C31

1 February 2015 in German Economic Review
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Journal Article
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PDF file
BBBettina Büttner
Bettina Büttner
STStephan L. Thomsen
Stephan L. Thomsen