Daniel P. Gross

Daniel P. Gross

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Daniel P. Gross

National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 February 2024 in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
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JFJames Feigenbaum
James Feigenbaum
DGDaniel P Gross
Daniel P Gross
In the early 1900s, telephone operation was among the most common jobs for American women, and telephone operators were ubiquitous. Between 1920 and 1940, AT&T undertook one of the largest automation investments in modern history, replacing operators with mechanical switching technology in over half of the U.S. telephone network. Using variation across U.S. cities in the timing of adoption, we study how this wave of automation affected the labor market for young women. Although automation eliminated most of these jobs, it did not reduce future cohorts’ overall employment: the decline in operators was counteracted by employment growth in middle-skill clerical jobs and lower-skill service jobs, including new categories of work. Using a new genealogy-based census-linking method, we show that incumbent telephone operators were most affected, and a decade later more likely to be in lower-paying occupations or no longer working.

17 May 2017 in The RAND Journal of Economics
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DGDaniel P. Gross
Daniel P. Gross

1 April 2023 in Management Science
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DGDaniel P. Gross
Daniel P. Gross
One of the most commanding powers of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is to compel inventions into secrecy, withholding patent rights and prohibiting disclosure, to prevent technology from leaking to foreign competitors. This paper studies the impacts of compulsory secrecy on firm invention and the wider innovation system. In World War II, USPTO issued secrecy orders to more than 11,000 patent applications, which it rescinded en masse at the end of the war. Compulsory secrecy caused implicated firms to shift their patenting away from treated classes, with effects persisting through at least 1960. It also restricted commercialization and impeded follow-on innovation. Yet it appears it was effective at keeping sensitive technology out of public view. The results provide insight into the effectiveness of compulsory secrecy as a regulatory strategy and into the roles, and impacts, of formal intellectual property in the innovation system. This paper was accepted by Toby Stuart, entrepreneurship and innovation. Funding: This work was supported by Harvard Business School (Division of Research and Faculty Development) and the National Bureau of Economic Research (Innovation Policy Grant). This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant 1951470]. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4457 .

2 May 2018 in The RAND Journal of Economics
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DGDaniel P. Gross
Daniel P. Gross

1 December 2024 in Management Science
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JFJames Feigenbaum
James Feigenbaum
DGDaniel P. Gross
Daniel P. Gross
AT&T was the largest U.S. firm for most of the 20th century. Telephone operators once comprised more than 50% of its workforce, but in the late 1910s, it initiated a decades-long process of automating telephone operation with mechanical call switching—a technology invented in the 1880s. We study what drove AT&T to do so and why it took nearly a century. Interdependencies between call switching and nearly every other activity in AT&T’s business presented obstacles to change: Telephone operators were the fulcrum of a complex production system that had developed around them, and automation only began after the firm and new technology were adapted to work together. Even then, automatic switching was only profitable in larger markets—hence, diffusion expanded when the technology improved or service areas grew. The example suggests even narrowly defined tasks can be difficult to automate if they interact with many others. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: The authors thank the Duke University Fuqua School of Business and Harvard Business School Division of Research and Faculty Development for financial support. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01760 .

27 July 2023 in Research Policy
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DGDaniel P. Gross
Daniel P. Gross
BSBhaven N. Sampat
Bhaven N. Sampat