Social distrust of AI stems in part from incomplete and faulty data sources, inappropriate redeployment of data, and frequently exposed errors that reflect and amplify existing social cleavages and failures, such as racial and gender biases. Other sources of distrust include the lack of “ground truth” against which to measure the results of learned algorithms, divergence of interests between those affected and those designing the tools, invasion of individual privacy, and the inapplicability of measures such as transparency and participation that build trust in other institutions. Needed steps to increase trust in AI systems include involvement of broader and diverse stakeholders in decisions around selection of uses, data, and predictors; investment in methods of recourse for errors and bias commensurate with the risks of errors and bias; and regulation prompting competition for trust.
We present connections between the recent literature on multigroup fairness for prediction algorithms and classical results in computational complexity. Multiaccurate predictors are correct in expectation on each member of an arbitrary collection of pre-specified sets. Multicalibrated predictors satisfy a stronger condition: they are calibrated on each set in the collection. Multiaccuracy is equivalent to a regularity notion for functions defined by Trevisan, Tulsiani, and Vadhan (2009). They showed that, given a class F of (possibly simple) functions, an arbitrarily complex function g can be approximated by a low-complexity function h that makes a small number of oracle calls to members of F, where the notion of approximation requires that h cannot be distinguished from g by members of F. This complexity-theoretic Regularity Lemma is known to have implications in different areas, including in complexity theory, additive number theory, information theory, graph theory, and cryptography. Starting from the stronger notion of multicalibration, we obtain stronger and more general versions of a number of applications of the Regularity Lemma, including the Hardcore Lemma, the Dense Model Theorem, and the equivalence of conditional pseudo-min-entropy and unpredictability. For example, we show that every boolean function (regardless of its hardness) has a small collection of disjoint hardcore sets, where the sizes of those hardcore sets are related to how balanced the function is on corresponding pieces of an efficient partition of the domain.
We study the impact of content moderation policies in online communities. In our theoretical model, a platform chooses a content moderation policy and individuals choose whether or not to participate in the community according to the fraction of user content that aligns with their preferences. The effects of content moderation, at first blush, might seem obvious: platform speech is restricted. However, when user participation decisions are taken into account, its effects can be more subtle --- and counter-intuitive. For example, our model can straightforwardly demonstrate how moderation policies mayincrease participation and/ordiversify content available on the platform. In our analysis, we explore a rich set of interconnected phenomena related to content moderation in online communities. We first characterize the effectiveness of a natural class of moderation policies for creating and sustaining communities. Building on this, we explore how resource-limited or ideological platforms might set policies, how communities are affected by differing levels of personalization, and competition between platforms. Our model provides a vocabulary and mathematically tractable framework for analyzing platform decisions about content moderation.
Professional networks --- the social networks among people in a given line of work --- can serve as a conduit for job prospects and other opportunities. Here we propose a model for the formation of such networks and the transfer of opportunities within them. In our theoretical model, individuals strategically connect with others to maximize the probability that they receive opportunities from them. We explore how professional networks balance connectivity, where connections facilitate opportunity transfers to those who did not get them from outside sources, and congestion, where some individuals receive too many opportunities from their connections and waste some of them. We show that strategic individuals are over-connected at equilibrium relative to a social optimum, leading to a price of anarchy for which we derive nearly tight asymptotic bounds. We also show that, at equilibrium, individuals form connections to those who provide similar benefit to them as they provide to others. Thus, our model provides a microfoundation in professional networking contexts for the fundamental sociological principle of homophily, that "similarity breeds connection" [McPherson et al., 2001], which in our setting is realized as a form of status homophily based on alignment in individual benefit. We further explore how, even if individuals are a priori equally likely to receive opportunities from outside sources, equilibria can be unequal, and we provide nearly tight bounds on how unequal they can be. Finally, we explore the ability for online platforms to intervene to improve social welfare and show that natural heuristics may result in adverse effects at equilibrium. Our simple model allows for a surprisingly rich analysis of coordination problems in professional networks and suggests many directions for further exploration.
The US Decennial Census provides valuable data for both research and policy purposes. Census data are subject to a variety of disclosure avoidance techniques prior to release in order to preserve respondent confidentiality. While many are interested in studying the impacts of disclosure avoidance methods on downstream analyses, particularly with the introduction of differential privacy in the 2020 Decennial Census, these efforts are limited by a critical lack of data: The underlying "microdata," which serve as necessary input to disclosure avoidance methods, are kept confidential. In this work, we aim to address this limitation by providing tools to generate synthetic microdata solely from published Census statistics, which can then be used as input to any number of disclosure avoidance algorithms for the sake of evaluation and carrying out comparisons. We define a principled distributionover microdata given published Census statistics and design algorithms to sample from this distribution. We formulate synthetic data generation in this context as a knapsack-style combinatorial optimization problem and develop novel algorithms for this setting. While the problem we study is provably hard, weshow empirically that our methods work well in practice, and we offer theoretical arguments to explain our performance. Finally, we verify that the data we produce are "close" to the desired ground truth.