Gangshu (George) Cai

Gangshu (George) Cai

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Gangshu (George) Cai

Santa Clara University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 March 2010 in Journal of Retailing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GCGangshu (George) Cai
Gangshu (George) Cai

29 March 2012 in Production and Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
BJBing Jing
Bing Jing
XCXiangfeng Chen
Xiangfeng Chen
GCGangshu (George) Cai
Gangshu (George) Cai

1 January 2009 in International Journal of Production Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GCGangshu (George) Cai
Gangshu (George) Cai
ZZZhe George Zhang
Zhe George Zhang
MZMichael Zhang
Michael Zhang

19 July 2013 in Production and Operations Management
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Journal Article
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PDF file
GCGangshu (George) Cai
Gangshu (George) Cai
XCXiangfeng Chen
Xiangfeng Chen
ZXZhiguo Xiao
Zhiguo Xiao

1 February 2018 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
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Journal Article
Closed access
SDShiming Deng
Shiming Deng
CGChaocheng Gu
Chaocheng Gu
GCGangshu (George) Cai
Gangshu (George) Cai
YLYanhai Li
Yanhai Li
Buyer finance has been practiced by manufacturers/assemblers for years; however, few papers have investigated the efficacy of buyer finance in an assembly system with multiple suppliers. This paper fills the literature gap by comparing buyer finance with bank finance in a supply chain with one assembler and multiple heterogeneous capital-constrained component suppliers. We characterize the equilibrium solutions for different financing schemes (i.e., buyer finance, bank finance, and no finance). We show that in buyer finance the assembler should charge the suppliers the lowest possible interest rate, which may be even below its own unit capital opportunity cost, leading to interest losses in financing suppliers. However, the assembler can benefit more from enhanced inventory backup and lower component purchasing prices resulting from the low buyer-finance interest rate. We further compare the two financing schemes from the perspectives of the assembler, the borrowing and nonborrowing suppliers, and the whole supply chain. Our analysis reveals that the assembler may offer buyer finance even if its own unit capital opportunity cost is higher than the bank risk-free interest rate. We also demonstrate how the suppliers’ initial capitals, production costs, and their heterogeneities affect the assembler’s selection of the optimal financing scheme and identify the conditions under which buyer finance is better than bank finance for different parties in this assembly supply chain. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0677 .

1 November 2014 in Production and Operations Management
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
BLBin Liu
Bin Liu
GCGangshu (George) Cai
Gangshu (George) Cai
ATAndy A. Tsay
Andy A. Tsay