Cristian Vaccari

Cristian Vaccari

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Cristian Vaccari

University of Edinburgh, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2020 in Social Media + Society
Verified
Journal Article
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CVCristian Vaccari
Cristian Vaccari
ACAndrew Chadwick
Andrew Chadwick
Artificial Intelligence (AI) now enables the mass creation of what have become known as “deepfakes”: synthetic videos that closely resemble real videos. Integrating theories about the power of visual communication and the role played by uncertainty in undermining trust in public discourse, we explain the likely contribution of deepfakes to online disinformation. Administering novel experimental treatments to a large representative sample of the United Kingdom population allowed us to compare people’s evaluations of deepfakes. We find that people are more likely to feel uncertain than to be misled by deepfakes, but this resulting uncertainty, in turn, reduces trust in news on social media. We conclude that deepfakes may contribute toward generalized indeterminacy and cynicism, further intensifying recent challenges to online civic culture in democratic societies.

5 April 2021 in Social Media + Society
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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ACAndrew Chadwick
Andrew Chadwick
JKJohannes Kaiser
Johannes Kaiser
CVCristian Vaccari
Cristian Vaccari
DFDaniel Freeman
Daniel Freeman
SLSinéad Lambe
Sinéad Lambe
LYLy-Mee Yu
Ly-Mee Yu
We explore the implications of online social endorsement for the Covid-19 vaccination program in the United Kingdom. Vaccine hesitancy is a long-standing problem, but it has assumed great urgency due to the pandemic. By early 2021, the United Kingdom had the world’s highest Covid-19 mortality per million of population. Our survey of a nationally representative sample of UK adults (N = 5,114) measured socio-demographics, social and political attitudes, media diet for getting news about Covid-19, and intention to use social media and personal messaging apps to encourage or discourage vaccination against Covid-19. Cluster analysis identified six distinct media diet groups: news avoiders, mainstream/official news samplers, super seekers, omnivores, the social media dependent, and the TV dependent. We assessed whether these media diets, together with key attitudes, including Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy, conspiracy mentality, and the news-finds-me attitude (meaning giving less priority to active monitoring of news and relying more on one’s online networks of friends for information), predict the intention to encourage or discourage vaccination. Overall, super-seeker and omnivorous media diets are more likely than other media diets to be associated with the online encouragement of vaccination. Combinations of (a) news avoidance and high levels of the news-finds-me attitude and (b) social media dependence and high levels of conspiracy mentality are most likely to be associated with online discouragement of vaccination. In the direct statistical model, a TV-dependent media diet is more likely to be associated with online discouragement of vaccination, but the moderation model shows that a TV-dependent diet most strongly attenuates the relationship between vaccine hesitancy and discouraging vaccination. Our findings support public health communication based on four main methods. First, direct contact, through the post, workplace, or community structures, and through phone counseling via local health services, could reach the news avoiders. Second, TV public information advertisements should point to authoritative information sources, such as National Health Service (NHS) and other public health websites, which should then feature clear and simple ways for people to share material among their online social networks. Third, informative social media campaigns will provide super seekers with good resources to share, while also encouraging the social media dependent to browse away from social media platforms and visit reliable and authoritative online sources. Fourth, social media companies should expand and intensify their removal of vaccine disinformation and anti-vax accounts, and such efforts should be monitored by well-resourced, independent organizations.

1 April 2018 in Sage Open
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CVCristian Vaccari
Cristian Vaccari
AVAugusto Valeriani
Augusto Valeriani
We investigate whether and how informal political talk on digital media contributes to citizens’ political participation with unique surveys based on samples representative of Internet users in seven Western democracies. We show that political talk on both social networking sites and mobile instant messaging platforms is positively associated with institutional and extra-institutional political participation. However, the relationship between talk on social networking sites and both types of participation is significantly stronger in established democracies (Denmark, France, United Kingdom, and United States) than in “third wave” democracies (Greece, Poland, and Spain). By contrast, the strength of the relationship between political talk on mobile instant messaging platforms and participation is not significantly different when comparing established and more recent democracies. These findings suggest that informal political talk on digital platforms can contribute to citizens’ participatory repertoires and that different institutional settings, in combination with different technological affordances, play an important role in shaping these patterns.

30 March 2022 in Journal of Communication
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Journal Article
Open access
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JKJohannes Kaiser
Johannes Kaiser
CVCristian Vaccari
Cristian Vaccari
ACAndrew Chadwick
Andrew Chadwick
Researchers know little about how people respond to misinformation shared by their social media “friends.” Do responses scale up to distort the structure of online networks? We focus on an important yet under-researched response to misinformation—blocking or unfollowing a friend who shares it—and assess whether this is influenced by political similarity between friends. Using a representative sample of social media users (n = 968), we conducted two 2 × 2 between-subjects experiments focusing on two political issues and individuals’ political ideology as a quasi-factor. The first factor manipulated who shared the misinformation (politically similar vs. dissimilar friend); the second manipulated the misinformation’s plausibility (implausible vs. moderately plausible). Our findings, which replicated across political issues and levels of plausibility, reveal that social media users, particularly left-wing users, are more likely to block and unfollow politically dissimilar than similar friends who share misinformation. Partisan blocking contributes to network polarization on social media.

10 May 2023 in Digital Journalism
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ACAndrew Chadwick
Andrew Chadwick
CVCristian Vaccari
Cristian Vaccari
NHNatalie-Anne Hall
Natalie-Anne Hall
Online personal messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger are now hugely popular around the world. Yet their role in the spread and social correction of misinformation remains under-researched. We carried out in-depth, semi-structured interviews with the UK public (N = 102) to explore how social relationships and technological design interact and foster norms regulating how people respond when their everyday social ties share misinformation on these platforms. Conceptualizing messaging as hybrid public-interpersonal communication, we develop a framework that situates online political talk in the context of everyday social interaction. We show that, among our participants, a norm of conflict avoidance is particularly powerful on these platforms and makes people reluctant to speak out. Conflict avoidance should therefore be taken seriously as a contributor to the diffusion of misinformation in everyday life. Policymakers and other stakeholders, including news organizations, should explore new, tailored ways to empower citizens to challenge misinformation in these important online spaces, where automated and algorithmic interventions are impossible.

29 September 2022 in Political Communication
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CVCristian Vaccari
Cristian Vaccari
ACAndrew Chadwick
Andrew Chadwick
JKJohannes Kaiser
Johannes Kaiser
We explain why citizens believed and shared false political information during the 2019 UK general election campaign. In two surveys of samples mirroring the adult population conducted before the vote (total N = 4018), we showed respondents 24 different news statements and asked if they had seen them before, whether they believed them, and how likely they would be to share them on social media. The statements included actual disinformation that was circulating and had been debunked, placebos that did not feature in the campaign but were carefully constructed to resemble actual false statements spreading at the time, and true statements that were being reported during the campaign. We find that the more that respondents received their campaign news via professional news organizations, the more they were able to distinguish true from false information. Conversely, the more that respondents used social media for campaign news, the less they were able to distinguish true from false information. These differences also shaped the intention to share true versus false news, and false news, once perceived as accurate, was more likely to be shared than true news overall. This “campaign disinformation divide” between getting news from professional journalistic organizations and news from social media has important implications for contemporary election campaigns in democratic public spheres.