Two primary goals of psychological science should be to understand what aspects of human psychology are universal and the way that context and culture produce variability. This requires that we take into account the importance of culture and context in the way that we write our papers and in the types of populations that we sample. However, most research published in our leading journals has relied on sampling WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) populations. One might expect that our scholarly work and editorial choices would by now reflect the knowledge that Western populations may not be representative of humans generally with respect to any given psychological phenomenon. However, as we show here, almost all research published by one of our leading journals, Psychological Science , relies on Western samples and uses these data in an unreflective way to make inferences about humans in general. To take us forward, we offer a set of concrete proposals for authors, journal editors, and reviewers that may lead to a psychological science that is more representative of the human condition.
Virtual Reality (VR) has been touted as an effective empathy intervention, with its most ardent supporters claiming it is “the ultimate empathy machine.” We aimed to determine whether VR deserves this reputation, using a random-effects meta-analysis of all known studies that examined the effect of virtual reality experiences on users’ empathy (k = 43 studies, with 5,644 participants). The results indicated that many different kinds of VR experiences can increase empathy, however, there are important boundary conditions to this effect. Subgroup analyses revealed that VR improved emotional empathy, but not cognitive empathy. In other words, VR can arouse compassionate feelings but does not appear to encourage users to imagine other peoples’ perspectives. Further subgroup analyses revealed that VR was no more effective at increasing empathy than less technologically advanced empathy interventions such as reading about others and imagining their experiences. Finally, more immersive and interactive VR experiences were no more effective at arousing empathy than less expensive VR experiences such as cardboard headsets. Our results converge with existing research suggesting that different mechanisms underlie cognitive versus emotional empathy. It appears that emotional empathy can be aroused automatically when witnessing evocative stimuli in VR, but cognitive empathy may require more effortful engagement, such as using one’s own imagination to construct others’ experiences. Our results have important practical implications for nonprofits, policymakers, and practitioners who are considering using VR for prosocial purposes. In addition, we recommend that VR designers develop experiences that challenge people to engage in empathic effort.
15 May 2021 in Social and Personality Psychology Compass
Empathy is frequently described in opposition to rationality. Yet in two studies, we demonstrate that the relationship between rationality and empathy is nuanced and likely context dependent. Study 1 reports correlational data from two American samples and Study 2 presents a meta-analysis of existing literature (k = 22). We demonstrate that various types of cognitive empathy (perspective-taking, emotion recognition, and fantasy) are positively correlated with self-reported rationality, but unrelated to rational performance. In contrast, types of emotional empathy (empathic concern, personal distress, and emotion contagion) are generally negatively correlated with performance measures of rationality, but their relationships with self-reported rationality are divergent. Although these results do not settle the debate on empathy and rationality, they challenge the opposing domains hypothesis and provide tentative support for a dual-process model of empathy. Overall, these results indicate that the relationship between rationality and empathy differs depending upon how rationality and empathy are measured.
We investigated the effects of long-term exposure to literary and popular fiction on attributional complexity, egocentric bias and accuracy. Results of a pre-registered study showed that exposure to literary fiction is positively associated with scores on the attributional complexity scale. Literary fiction is also associated with accuracy in mentalizing, measured via the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, and with accuracy in predicting average social attitudes. The predicted negative association between literary fiction and egocentric bias emerged only when education and gender were controlled for–a covariance analysis that was not pre-registered. Exposure to popular fiction is associated solely with attributional complexity, but negatively. We discuss the significance of these findings in the context of the emerging literature regarding the relationship between fiction and social cognition.