1 August 2001 in Games and Economic Behavior
1 December 2016 in Experimental Economics
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the repeated game over—a simple fresh start—leads to an initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new decay. Motivated by cooperation decay in organizations we study the potential of three interventions of triggering higher and sustained cooperation, which take place at the same time as a restart. Surprisingly, we find that the detailed explanation of the causes of the decay in cooperation of Fischbacher and Gächter (Am Econ Rev 100:541–556, 2010) combined with an advice on how to prevent decay do not have an effect beyond that of just starting over. In contrast, a one-way free form communication message sent by the leader to the followers strongly revives cooperation. We find evidence that repeated free form communication by the leader further strengthens the reviving effect on cooperation. Combining the two previous interventions does not outperform the pure effect of communication. Our content analysis reveals that leader communication is more people oriented than the expert advice.
1 February 2010 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Trabajo publicado como artículo en Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 73(2): 246-253 (2010).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.005We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.Financial support from Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (SEJ2007-67895-C04-03 “Organización de la empresa,\ud prácticas de gobierno y control familiar”), the Barcelona GSE Research Network Recognition of Research Program, Consolider\ud Ingenio 2010 (CSD2006-00016) and the Banca March Familiy Business Chair is greatfully acknowledged
1 September 2016 in Bioresource Technology
1 January 2016 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
1 April 2021 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization