Feng Cao

Feng Cao

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Feng Cao

Business School, Hunan University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 March 2017 in Corporate Governance: An International Review
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Journal Article
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JSJian Sun
Jian Sun
RYRongli Yuan
Rongli Yuan
FCFeng Cao
Feng Cao
BWBaiqiang Wang
Baiqiang Wang

21 August 2017 in Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting
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Journal Article
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FCFeng Cao
Feng Cao
KYKangtao Ye
Kangtao Ye
NZNing Zhang
Ning Zhang
SLSifei Li
Sifei Li

6 July 2026 in Journal of Accounting Literature
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FCFeng Cao
Feng Cao
LLLinfeng Li
Linfeng Li
XZXueyan Zhang
Xueyan Zhang
ZLZiru Lian
Ziru Lian
Purpose: This study aims to investigate how the transition from unidimensional (financial) to multidimensional (financial and environmental) bank screening – induced by China's 2012 Green Credit Guidelines (GCG) – affects corporate leverage manipulation. Specifically, we examine whether integrating environmental criteria into credit decisions exacerbates leverage manipulation due to heightened financing constraints or generates a disciplinary governance spillover that curbs such opportunism. Design/methodology/approach: Exploiting the promulgation of the GCG as a quasi-natural experiment, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) design on a comprehensive sample of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2016. To ensure robust causal identification, our empirical strategy isolates the credit supply channel via triple-difference (DDD) estimations and explicitly controls for concurrent macro-environmental policies and high-dimensional fixed effects. Findings: We document that the GCG significantly inhibits leverage manipulation among high-polluting firms, yielding a deleveraging effect that is economically comparable to major national macroeconomic shocks. Mechanistically, the policy operates by redirecting banks' attention toward environmental performance and intensifying their financial scrutiny of borrowers. Cross-sectional tests reveal that this external disciplinary effect is stronger in regions with heightened environmental awareness and less competitive banking sectors and acts as a crucial compensatory governance substitute for firms with lower information transparency and weaker corporate governance. Furthermore, curbing this manipulation facilitates substantive green innovation and optimal capital structure adjustments. Originality/value: This study bridges the environmental finance and accounting manipulation literatures by uncovering a novel “governance spillover” of green credit policies. We demonstrate that multidimensional screening standards extend beyond capital reallocation to fundamentally discipline corporate financial integrity, highlighting the profound implications of sustainable finance regulations for the corporate information environment.