Ersin Körpeoğlu

Ersin Körpeoğlu

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Ersin Körpeoğlu

School of Management, University College London, London E14 5AA, United Kingdom

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2020 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YCYing-Ju Chen
Ying-Ju Chen
TDTinglong Dai
Tinglong Dai
CKC. Gizem Korpeoglu
C. Gizem Korpeoglu
EKErsin Körpeoğlu
Ersin Körpeoğlu
OSOzge Sahin
Ozge Sahin
SXShihong Xiao
Shihong Xiao
Economic growth in many countries is increasingly driven by successful startups that operate as online platforms. These success stories have motivated us to define and classify various online platforms according to their business models. This study discusses strategic and operational issues arising from five types of online platforms (resource sharing, matching, crowdsourcing, review, and crowdfunding) and presents some research opportunities for operations management scholars to explore.

1 June 2017 in Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LALaurence Ales
Laurence Ales
SCSoo-Haeng Cho
Soo-Haeng Cho
EKErsin Körpeoğlu
Ersin Körpeoğlu
In an innovation tournament, an organizer solicits innovative ideas from a number of independent agents. Agents exert effort to develop their solutions, but their outcomes are unknown due to technical uncertainty and/or subjective evaluation criteria. To incentivize agents to make their best effort, the organizer needs to devise a proper award scheme. While extant literature either assumes a winner-take-all scheme a priori or shows its optimality under specific distributions for uncertainty, this paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which the winner-take-all scheme is optimal. These conditions are violated when agents perceive it very likely that only few agents receive high evaluation or when a tournament does not require substantial increase in agents’ marginal cost of effort to develop high-quality solutions. Yet, the winner-take-all scheme is optimal in many practical situations, especially when agents have symmetric beliefs about their evaluation. In this case, the organizer should offer a larger winner prize when he is interested in obtaining a higher number of good solutions, but interestingly the organizer need not necessarily raise the winner prize when anticipating more participants to a tournament. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1575 .

1 December 2020 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CKC. Gizem Korpeoglu
C. Gizem Korpeoglu
EKErsin Körpeoğlu
Ersin Körpeoğlu
SCSoo-Haeng Cho
Soo-Haeng Cho
We study supply chains where multiple suppliers sell to multiple retailers through a wholesale market. In practice, we often observe that both suppliers and retailers tend to influence the wholesale market price that retailers pay to suppliers. However, existing models of supply chain competition do not capture retailers’ influence on the wholesale price (i.e., buyer power) and show that the wholesale price and the order quantity per retailer do not change with the number of retailers. To overcome this limitation, we develop a competition model based on the market game mechanism in which the wholesale price is determined based on both suppliers’ and retailers’ decisions. When taking into account retailers’ buyer power, we obtain the result that is consistent with the observed practice: As the number of retailers increases, each retailer’s buyer power decreases, and each retailer is willing to pay more for her order, so the wholesale price increases. In this case, supply chain expansion to include more retailers (or suppliers) turns out to be more beneficial in terms of supply chain efficiency than what the prior literature shows without considering buyer power. Finally, we analyze the integration of two local supply chains and show that although the profit of the integrated supply chain is greater than the sum of total profits of local supply chains, integration may reduce the total profit of firms in a retailer-oriented supply chain that has more retailers than suppliers. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

1 June 2018 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EKErsin Körpeoğlu
Ersin Körpeoğlu
SCSoo-Haeng Cho
Soo-Haeng Cho
In a contest in which solvers with heterogeneous expertise exert effort to develop solutions, a recent paper [Terwiesch C, Xu Y (2008) Innovation contests, open innovation, and multiagent problem solving. Management Sci. 54(9):1529–1543] argues that as more solvers enter the contest, every solver will reduce effort due to a lower probability of winning the contest. This paper corrects mistakes in this theory, and shows that there exist high-expertise solvers who may raise their effort in response to increased competition. This is because more entrants raise the expected best performance among other solvers, creating positive incentives for solvers to exert higher effort to win the contest. Because of this positive effect, we find that a free-entry open contest is more likely to be optimal to a contest organizer than what Terwiesch and Xu (2008) and other prior literature asserted. The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2738 . This paper was accepted by Gad Allon, operations management.

1 May 2021 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CKC. Gizem Korpeoglu
C. Gizem Korpeoglu
EKErsin Körpeoğlu
Ersin Körpeoğlu
STSıdıka Tunç
Sıdıka Tunç
Problem definition : We study the contest duration and the award scheme of an innovation contest where an organizer elicits solutions to an innovation-related problem from a group of agents. Academic/practical relevance : Our interviews with practitioners at crowdsourcing platforms have revealed that the duration of a contest is an important operational decision. Yet, the theoretical literature has long overlooked this decision. Also, the literature fails to adequately explain why giving multiple unequal awards is so common in crowdsourcing platforms. We aim to fill these gaps between the theory and practice. We generate insights that seem consistent with both practice and empirical evidence. Methodology : We use a game-theoretic model where the organizer decides on the contest duration and the award scheme while each agent decides on her participation and determines her effort over the contest duration by considering potential changes in her productivity over time. The quality of an agent’s solution improves with her effort, but it is also subject to an output uncertainty. Results : We show that the optimal contest duration increases as the relative impact of the agent uncertainty on her output increases, and it decreases if the agent productivity increases over time. We characterize an optimal award scheme and show that giving multiple (almost always) unequal awards is optimal when the organizer’s urgency in obtaining solutions is below a certain threshold. We also show that this threshold is larger when the agent productivity increases over time. Finally, consistent with empirical findings, we show that there is a positive correlation between the optimal contest duration and the optimal total award. Managerial implications : Our results suggest that the optimal contest duration increases with the novelty or sophistication of solutions that the organizer seeks, and it decreases when the organizer can offer support tools that can increase the agent productivity over time. These insights and their drivers seem consistent with practice. Our findings also suggest that giving multiple unequal awards is advisable for an organizer who has low urgency in obtaining solutions. Finally, giving multiple awards goes hand in hand with offering support tools that increase the agent productivity over time. These results help explain why many contests on crowdsourcing platforms give multiple unequal awards.

1 June 2010 in Computers & Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SGSinan Gürel
Sinan Gürel
EKErsin Körpeoğlu
Ersin Körpeoğlu
MAM. Selim Aktürk
M. Selim Aktürk