Antibiotic use drives the development and spread of resistant bacterial infections. Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has become a prolific global issue, due to significant increases in antibiotic use in humans, livestock and agriculture, inappropriate use (under-dosing and over-prescribing), and misuse of antibiotics (for viral infections where they are ineffective). Fewer new antibiotics are being developed. AMR is now considered a key threat to global health, leading to more mortality and increased healthcare costs threatening future conduct of routine medical procedures. Traditional approaches to address AMR include antibiotic stewardship, better hygiene/infection control, promoting antibiotic research and development, and restricting use for agricultural purposes. While antibiotic development is declining, vaccine technology is growing. This review shows how vaccines can decrease AMR by preventing bacterial and viral infections, thereby reducing the use/misuse of antibiotics, and by preventing antibiotic-resistant infections. Vaccines are less likely to induce resistance. Some future uses and developments of vaccines are also discussed. Vaccines, along with other approaches, can help reduce AMR by preventing (resistant) infections and reducing antibiotic use. Industry and governments must focus on the development of novel vaccines and drugs against resistant infections to successfully reduce AMR. A graphical abstract is available online.
Fanny Chereau and colleagues assess the risk of the emergence and spread of antibiotic resistance in South East Asia and suggest it is the highest of the World Health Organization regions
A pilot programme to evaluate Indonesia’s antimicrobial resistance containment plan shows that progress is on the right track, but substantial strengthening is needed, say Harry Parathon and colleagues
Sirenda Vong and colleagues argue that investing in information technology surveillance systems to detect trends is an essential first step in tackling antimicrobial resistance in South East Asian countries
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus has been of public health concern since 2003. Probable risk factors for A(H5N1) transmission to human have been demonstrated in several studies or epidemiological reports. However, transmission patterns may differ according to demographic characteristics of the population and local practices. This article aggregates these data from three studies with data collected in the previous surveys in 2006 and 2007 to further examine the risks factors associated with presence of anti-A(H5) antibodies among villagers residing within outbreak areas. We aggregated 5-year data (2006–2010) from serology survey and matched case-control studies in Cambodia to further examine the risks factors associated with A(H5N1) infection among villagers in the outbreak areas. Serotesting among villagers detected 35 (1.5 % [0–2.6]) positive cases suggesting recent exposure to A(H5N1) virus. Practices associated with A(H5N1) infection among all ages were: having poultry cage or nesting area under or adjacent to the house (OR: 6.7 [1.6–28.3]; p = 0.010) and transporting poultry to market (OR: 17.6 [1.6–193.7]; p = 0.019). Practices found as risk factors for the infection among age under 20 years were swimming/bathing in ponds also accessed by domestic poultry (OR: 4.6 [1.1–19.1]; p = 0.038). Association with consuming wild birds reached borderline significance (p = 0.066). Our results suggest that swimming/bathing in contaminated pond water and close contact with poultry may present a risk of A(H5N1) transmission to human.
1 December 2016 in Bulletin of the World Health Organization
To conduct assessments of Ebola virus disease preparedness in countries of the World Health Organization (WHO) South-East Asia Region. Nine of 11 countries in the region agreed to be assessed. During February to November 2015 a joint team from WHO and ministries of health conducted 4-5 day missions to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Timor-Leste. We collected information through guided discussions with senior technical leaders and visits to hospitals, laboratories and airports. We assessed each country's Ebola virus disease preparedness on 41 tasks under nine key components adapted from the WHO Ebola preparedness checklist of January 2015. Political commitment to Ebola preparedness was high in all countries. Planning was most advanced for components that had been previously planned or tested for influenza pandemics: multilevel and multisectoral coordination; multidisciplinary rapid response teams; public communication and social mobilization; drills in international airports; and training on personal protective equipment. Major vulnerabilities included inadequate risk assessment and risk communication; gaps in data management and analysis for event surveillance; and limited capacity in molecular diagnostic techniques. Many countries had limited planning for a surge of Ebola cases. Other tasks needing improvement included: advice to inbound travellers; adequate isolation rooms; appropriate infection control practices; triage systems in hospitals; laboratory diagnostic capacity; contact tracing; and danger pay to staff to ensure continuity of care. Joint assessment and feedback about the functionality of Ebola virus preparedness systems help countries strengthen their core capacities to meet the International Health Regulations.