Fake news is an age-old phenomenon, widely assumed to be associated with political propaganda published to sway public opinion. Yet, with the growth of social media, it has become a lucrative business for Web publishers. Despite many studies performed and countermeasures proposed, unreliable news sites have increased in the last years their share of engagement among the top performing news sources. Stifling fake news impact depends on our efforts in limiting the (economic) incentives of fake news producers. In this paper, we aim at enhancing the transparency around these exact incentives, and explore: Who supports the existence of fake news websites via paid ads, either as an advertiser or an ad seller? Who owns these websites and what other Web business are they into? We are the first to systematize the auditing process of fake news revenue flows. We identify the companies that advertise in fake news websites and the intermediary companies responsible for facilitating those ad revenues. We study more than 2,400 popular news websites and show that well-known ad networks, such as Google and IndexExchange, have a direct advertising relation with more than 40% of fake news websites. Using a graph clustering approach on 114.5K sites, we show that entities who own fake news sites, also operate other types of websites pointing to the fact that owning a fake news website is part of a broader business operation.
Providing online content monetized via ads to users is a lucrative business. But what if the content is pirated or illicit, thus harming the brand safety of the advertiser? In this paper, we are the first to investigate Ad Laundering: a technique with which bad actors deceive advertisers by hiding illicit content within evidently lawful websites to monetize the generated traffic. We develop a client-side detection methodology to detect and analyze websites performing ad laundering. We describe in detail the techniques these websites use to cloak content, and provide estimations for the ad revenues they are able to collect on a monthly basis. Finally, we attribute the generated revenue to different traffic channels and establish that even popular brands have their ads rendered next to undesirable content.
Fake news is an age-old phenomenon, widely assumed to be associated with political propaganda published to sway public opinion. Yet, with the growth of social media, it has become a lucrative business for Web publishers. Despite many studies performed and countermeasures proposed, unreliable news sites have increased in the last years their share of engagement among the top performing news sources. Stifling fake news impact depends on our efforts in limiting the (economic) incentives of fake news producers. In this paper, we aim at enhancing the transparency around these exact incentives, and explore: Who supports the existence of fake news websites via paid ads, either as an advertiser or an ad seller? Who owns these websites and what other Web business are they into? We are the first to systematize the auditing process of fake news revenue flows. We identify the companies that advertise in fake news websites and the intermediary companies responsible for facilitating those ad revenues. We study more than 2,400 popular news websites and show that well-known ad networks, such as Google and IndexExchange, have a direct advertising relation with more than 40% of fake news websites. Using a graph clustering approach on 114.5K sites, we show that entities who own fake news sites, also operate other types of websites pointing to the fact that owning a fake news website is part of a broader business operation.
Contemporary browsers constitute a critical component of our everyday interactions with the Web. Similar to a small, but powerful operating system, a browser is responsible to fetch and run web apps locally, on the user's (mobile) device. Even though in the last few years, there has been an increased interest for tools and mechanisms to block potentially malicious behaviours of web domains against the users' privacy (e.g., ad blockers, incognito browsing mode, etc.), it is still unclear if the user can browse the Web in private. In this paper, we analyse the natively generated network traffic of 15 mobile browser apps under different configurations to investigate if the users are capable of browsing the Web privately, without sharing their browsing history with remote servers. We develop a novel framework (Panoptes) to instrument and monitor separately the mobile browser traffic generated by (a) the web engine and (b) natively by the mobile app. By crawling a set of websites via Panoptes, and analyzing the native traffic of browsers, we find that there are browsers (i) who persistently track their users, and (ii) browsers that report to remote servers (geolocated outside EU), the exact page and content the user is browsing at that moment. Finally, we see browsers communicating with third-party ad servers while leaking personal and device identifiers.