William J. Mayew

William J. Mayew

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William J. Mayew

Duke University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2013 in Review of Accounting Studies
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Journal Article
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SDShane S. Dikolli
Shane S. Dikolli
WMWilliam J. Mayew
William J. Mayew
DNDhananjay Nanda
Dhananjay Nanda

25 September 2012 in Review of Accounting Studies
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WMWilliam J. Mayew
William J. Mayew
NSNathan Y. Sharp
Nathan Y. Sharp
MVMohan Venkatachalam
Mohan Venkatachalam

28 February 2009 in Review of Accounting Studies
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RFRichard Frankel
Richard Frankel
WMWilliam J. Mayew
William J. Mayew
YSYan Sun
Yan Sun

1 September 2019 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
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SDShane S. Dikolli
Shane S. Dikolli
TKThomas Keusch
Thomas Keusch
WMWilliam J. Mayew
William J. Mayew
TSThomas D. Steffen
Thomas D. Steffen
We investigate the audit fee response to CEO behavioral integrity (BI). BI refers to the perceived congruence between an individual's words and deeds (Simons 2002). Because low word-deed congruence should result in more explanations when communicating, we use variation in explanations beyond firm fundamentals and CEO-specific characteristics in more than 30,000 shareholder letters to serve as a linguistic-based proxy for CEO BI. We find that audit fees increase as BI decreases, but BI is not associated with financial misstatement or litigation. These findings are potentially consistent with auditors undertaking additional work in response to low BI, which, in turn, mitigates the risk of restatements and lawsuits. The likelihood of option backdating increases as BI decreases, consistent with the contention that auditors lacked incentives to prevent backdating. Finally, BI is increasing in future performance, which suggests that CEOs partially underpin the returns to high-integrity corporate cultures. JEL Classifications: J24; L25; M14; M41; M42. Data Availability: Proprietary data from KRW International cannot be shared because of the terms of a confidentiality agreement. All other data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

17 February 2020 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
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WMWilliam J. Mayew
William J. Mayew
MSMani Sethuraman
Mani Sethuraman
MVMohan Venkatachalam
Mohan Venkatachalam
This paper deepens our understanding of the anatomy of an earnings conference call. Prior research indicates that, on average, analysts providing bullish stock recommendations or beatable earnings forecasts benefit from greater access to corporate management. Therefore, we analyze whether and to what extent individual analysts' ex ante stock recommendations and earnings forecasts affect the information content of analyst-manager conversations. Using intraday absolute stock price reactions around specific analyst-manager dialogs to measure informativeness, we find that manager dialogs with bearish analysts whose forecasts are missed are more informative. Such analysts engage in longer conversations with more back-and-forth iterations and exhibit a more negative tone, relative to bullish analysts that provide beatable forecasts. Stock prices directionally respond to both the analyst's linguistic tone and the manager's voice pitch. In sum, the capital market effects during an earnings conference call are far more nuanced than previously documented.

18 December 2009 in Review of Accounting Studies
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YEYonca Ertimur
Yonca Ertimur
WMWilliam J. Mayew
William J. Mayew
SSStephen R. Stubben
Stephen R. Stubben