8 April 2020 in Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
2 November 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Mutation-based fuzzing has been widely used in both academia and industry. Recently, researchers observe that the mutation scheduling scheme affects the efficiency of fuzzing. Accordingly, they propose PSO algorithm or machine learning-based technique to optimize the scheduling process. However, these methods fail to consider the fact that the optimal operator distribution of different seeds is different, even for the same program. In this paper, we propose a novel general scheduling scheme, named FA-fuzz, to find the optimal selecting probability distribution of mutation operators, which is based on the observations that the effective mutation operators are different for different seeds. Specifically, our method is based on the firefly algorithm. The positions of fireflies are mapped to the selection probability distribution of different mutation operators. The brightness of fireflies is expressed as the efficiency of discovering unique testcases. We implement prototype systems on multiple state-of-art fuzzers, and perform evaluations on two datasets. Our proposed method improves both the number of unique paths and unique bugs on real-world datasets. In addition, we discover 30 zero-day vulnerabilities in eight real-world programs, which demonstrate the effectiveness of FA-fuzz.
13 November 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
macOS drivers, i.e., Kernel EXTensions (kexts), are attractive attack targets for adversaries. However, automatically discovering vulnerabilities in kexts is extremely challenging because kexts are mostly closed-source, and the latest macOS running on customized Apple Silicon has limited tool-chain support. Most existing static analysis and dynamic testing solutions cannot be applied to the latest macOS. In this paper, we present the first end-to-end fuzzing solution KextFuzz to detect bugs in the latest macOS kexts running on Apple Silicon. Unlike existing driver fuzzing solutions, KextFuzz does not require source code, execution traces, hypervisors, or hardware features (e.g., coverage tracing) and thus is universal and practical. We note that macOS has deployed many mitigations, including pointer authentication, code signature, and userspace kernel layer wrappers, to thwart potential attacks. These mitigations can provide extra knowledge and resources for us to enable kernel fuzzing. KextFuzz exploits these mitigation schemes to instrument the binary for coverage tracking, infer the type and semantic information of kext interfaces, and generate multi-dimension inputs. KextFuzz has found 49 unique kernel bugs in the macOS kexts and got five CVEs. Some bugs could cause severe consequences like running arbitrary code with kernel privilege.