We introduce a blockchain Fair Data Exchange (FDE) protocol, enabling a storage server to transfer a data file to a client atomically: the client receives the file if and only if the server receives an agreed-upon payment. We put forth a new definition for a cryptographic scheme that we name verifiable encryption under committed key (VECK), and we propose two instantiations for this scheme. Our protocol relies on a blockchain to enforce the atomicity of the exchange and uses VECK to ensure that the client receives the correct data (matching an agreed-upon commitment) before releasing the payment for the decrypting key. Our protocol is trust-minimized and requires only constant-sized on-chain communication, concretely 3 signatures, 1 verification key, and 1 secret key, with most of the data stored and communicated off-chain. It also supports exchanging only a subset of the data, can amortize the server's work across multiple clients, and offers a general framework to design alternative FDE protocols using different commitment schemes. A prominent application of our protocol is the Danksharding data availability scheme on Ethereum, which commits to data via KZG polynomial commitments. We also provide an open-source implementation for our protocol with both instantiations for VECK, demonstrating our protocol's efficiency and practicality on Ethereum.
We introduce the first practical protocols for fully decentralized sealed-bid auctions using timed commitments. Timed commitments ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all participants drop out after posting bids or if n bidders collude to try to learn the nth bidder's bid value. Our protocols rely on a novel non-malleable timed commitment scheme which efficiently supports range proofs to establish that bidders have sufficient funds to cover a hidden bid value. This allows us to penalize users who abandon bids for exactly the bid value, while supporting simultaneous bidding in multiple auctions with a shared collateral pool. Our protocols are concretely efficient and we have implemented them in an Ethereum-compatible smart contract which automatically enforces payment and delivery of an auctioned digital asset.
Blockchain-based payment systems utilize an append-only log of transactions whose correctness can be verified by any observer. Classically, verification costs grow linearly in either the number of transactions or blocks in the blockchain (often both). Incrementally Verifiable Computation (IVC) can be used to enable constant-time verification, but generating the necessary proofs is expensive. We introduce the notion of Proof of Necessary Work (PoNW), in which proof generation is an integral part of the proof-of-work used in Nakamoto consensus, producing proofs using energy that would otherwise be wasted. We implement and benchmark a prototype of our system, enabling stateless clients to verify the entire blockchain history in about 40 milliseconds.
Americans' trust in news is declining, and authenticity and transparency challenges in digital publishing contexts pose unique challenges to the ability to effectively gratify their information-seeking needs via online media. Cryptographic technologies and web-based provenance indicators have the potential to enhance the trustworthiness and transparency of digital communication, but better understandings of news consumers practices and needs are required to develop practical tools. Through a representative online survey of 400 digital news consumers and 19 follow-up interviews, we investigate how users authenticate and assign trust to news content, and identify specific needs pertaining to news transparency and authentication that could be met by digital news authentication tools. While many users currently rely on political ideology to assess news trustworthiness, we find that users of all political orientations see value in independent provenance and authentication tools for digital news.