Attribute-based anonymous credentials offer users fine-grained access control in a privacy-preserving manner. However, in such schemes obtaining a user's credentials requires knowledge of the issuer's public key, which obviously reveals the issuer's identity that must be hidden from users in certain scenarios. Moreover, verifying a user's credentials also requires the knowledge of issuer's public key, which may infer the user's private information from their choice of issuer. In this paper, we introduce the notion of double issuer-hiding attribute-based credentials ( ${\sf DIHAC}$ ) to tackle these two problems. In our model, a central authority can issue public-key credentials for a group of issuers, and users can obtain attribute-based credentials from one of the issuers without knowing which one it is. Then, a user can prove that their credential was issued by one of the authenticated issuers without revealing which one to a verifier. We provide a generic construction, as well as a concrete instantiation for ${\sf DIHAC}$ based on structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes (JOC's 19) and a novel primitive which we call tag-based aggregatable mercurial signatures . Our construction is efficient without relying on zero-knowledge proofs. We provide rigorous evaluations on personal laptop and smartphone platforms, respectively, to demonstrate its practicability.
Electronic tickets (e-tickets) are gradually being adopted as a substitute for paper-based tickets to bring convenience to customers, corporations, and governments. However, their adoption faces a number of practical challenges, such as flexibility, privacy, secure storage, and inability to deploy on IoT devices such as smartphones. These concerns motivate the current research on e-ticket systems, which seeks to ensure the unforgeability and authenticity of e-tickets while simultaneously protecting user privacy. Many existing schemes cannot fully satisfy all these requirements. To improve on the current state-of-the-art solutions, this paper constructs a blockchain-enhanced privacy-preserving e-ticket system for IoT devices, dubbed PriTKT, which is based on blockchain, structure-preserving signatures (SPS), unlinkable redactable signatures (URS), and zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP). It supports flexible policy-based ticket purchasing and ensures user unlinkability. According to the data minimization and revealing principle of GDPR, PriTKT empowers users to selectively disclose subsets of (necessary) attributes to sellers as long as the disclosed attributes satisfy ticket purchasing policies. In addition, benefiting from the decentralization and immutability of blockchain, effective detection and efficient tracing of double spending of e-tickets are supported in PriTKT. Considering the impracticality of existing e-tickets schemes with burdensome ZKPs, we replace them with URS/SPS or efficient ZKP to significantly improve the efficiency of ticket issuing and make it suitable for use on smartphones.
4 May 2020 in Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) not only eliminates the need for certificates in traditional certificate-based PKC but also solves the inherent key escrow problem in identity-based PKC. However, an unsolved but critical issue in CL-PKC is how to revoke a misbehaving user. Some revocable certificateless public key encryption (RCL-PKE) schemes have been proposed, but these schemes have two main drawbacks: 1) public key uniqueness is not guaranteed, thus allowing the existence of multiple copies of each initial secret key. 2) The existing outsourced RCL-PKE schemes place excessive trust in the cloud server, which may continue to update decryption keys stealthily for misbehaving users. In this paper, we address these issues by proposing a novel RCL-PKE with semi-trusted cloud revocation agents (s-CRAs). We describe the framework and the security model for the RCL-PKE with s-CRA and prove that the proposed scheme is semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Furthermore, we compare the proposed scheme with previous RCL-PKE schemes in terms of performance and robustness. The evaluation results show that the proposed scheme achieves public key uniqueness and reliable revocation flexibility at low computational and communication costs.
DNS over HTTPS (DoH) reduces the risk of privacy leakage of DNS queries, but it also provides a covert communication channel for malicious activities. In this paper, we propose a method for malicious encrypted traffic identification, which harnesses the advanced context comprehension of Large Language Model (LLM) and incorporates expert features to detect anomalies. The evaluation results show that the method proposed in this paper can not only identify common and emerging malicious DoH tunnel tools such as dns2tcp, iodine, and dnstt, but also identify weaponized DoH traffic within a real APT attack, with a recall of 0.9995.
Anonymous single sign-on systems allow users to use a single credential to access multiple services protected by verifiers without revealing their personal information, which is especially important due to privacy regulations such as GDPR. In this paper, we introduce a new strong privacy-preserving single sign-on scheme, dubbed PriSign, based on our proposed attribute-based credential with traceability (ABCT), attribute-based credential with blindness (ABCB), and threshold inner-product functional encryption (TIPFE). Compared with the existing state-of-the-art solutions, PriSign presents three improvements: (1) users can obtain different types of tickets according to the attribute disclosure policies enforced by the ticket issuer to support fine-grained access control; (2) users can hide access tokens and designate a verifier for tokens according to a verifier’s policy jointly issued by multiple policymakers, meaning that non-designated verifiers cannot obtain any information about the tokens; (3) we innovatively use a threshold approach to issue policy keys online in order for verifiers to achieve proxy re-verification services in an unstable cloud environment. We implement PriSign and compare the performance with other ASSO systems in the personal laptop, and the results prove its practicability.