Simon N. Foley

Simon N. Foley

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Simon N. Foley

Université Bretagne Loire

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

40Years (1987-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 1987
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
SFSimon N. Foley
Simon N. Foley
A new theory of information flow is presented. This theory is used to determine the information flows between the users of a system. Information flows when variety in the actions of a source user can be conveyed to a destination user. This theory is developed around Hoare'a calculus for communicating sequential processes. Information flows due to concurrency, non-determinism and input/output can be examined within the framework of this calculus.

7 January 2003
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
SFS.N. Foley
S.N. Foley

1 April 1997
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
SFSimon N. Foley
Simon N. Foley
A framework for the specification of security policies is proposed.It can used to formally specify confidentiality andintegrity policies, the latter can be given in terms of ClarkWilsonstyle access triples. The framework extends theClark-Wilson model in that it can be used to specify dynamicsegregation of duty.For application systems where security is critical, a multilevelsecurity based approach is defined. Security policiesfor less critical applications can be implemented using...

14 January 2003 in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SFS.N. Foley
S.N. Foley
Systems provide integrity protection by ensuring that there is no unauthorized modification of information. Traditional models of protection tend to define integrity in terms of ad hoc authorization techniques whose effectiveness is justified more on the basis of experience and "best practice," rather than on any common theoretical foundation. A formal definition of integrity is proposed that is independent of any particular implementation mechanism. A series of simple examples is used to demonstrate that existing integrity mechanisms such as separation of duties, well-formed transactions, and so forth, can be regarded as implementation techniques for achieving integrity. The proposed characterization of integrity is nonfunctional, that is, it falls into the same category of properties as noninterference and its relatives. As a consequence, validating that a system has integrity can be expected to be as challenging as validating that a system upholds noninterference.

1 April 1992 in Journal of Computer Security
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Journal Article
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SFSimon N. Foley
Simon N. Foley
This paper proposes a notation that can be used to describe information flow policies that may have transitivity, aggregation and separation (of duty) exceptions. Operators for comparing, composing and abstracting these policies are described. These

30 May 2011 in Journal of Computer Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
SFSimon N. Foley
Simon N. Foley
WFWilliam M. Fitzgerald
William M. Fitzgerald
Managing the configuration of heterogeneous enterprise security mechanisms is a complex task. The effectiveness of a configuration may be constrained by poor understanding and/or management of the overall security policy requirements, which may, in t