Luca Barlassina

Luca Barlassina

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Luca Barlassina

School of History, Philosophy, and Digital Humanities University of Sheffield Sheffield UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 November 2014 in Analysis
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Journal Article
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LBLuca Barlassina
Luca Barlassina
FPFabio Del Prete
Fabio Del Prete
If you utter sentence (1) ‘Obama was born in 1961’ now, you say something true about the past. Since the past will always be such that the year 1961 has the property of being a time in which Obama was born, it seems impossible that (1) could ever be false in a future context of utterance. We shall consider the case of a sentence about the past exactly like (1), but which was true when uttered a few years ago and is no longer true now. On this basis, we shall conclude that the past has changed.

19 April 2022 in Mind & Language
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Open access
MKMiklós Kürthy
Miklós Kürthy
FPFabio Del Prete
Fabio Del Prete
LBLuca Barlassina
Luca Barlassina
We consider the thorny issue of whether ascribing to an agent theobligationtoφimplies that it ispossiblefor the agent toφ. Traditionally, this issue has been interpreted as whether “ought” implies “can”. But another linguistic interpretation is available, namely, whether “must” implies “can” (MIC). We show that “must” does imply “can” via a convergent argument. First, we prove MIC from a well‐established theory of modality in natural language, namely, that proposed by Kratzer. Second, we present novel acceptability judgement studies showing that MIC predicts and explains the linguistic behaviour of native English speakers.

7 July 2026 in Mind & Language
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Journal Article
Open access
LBLuca Barlassina
Luca Barlassina
I put forward a novel cognitive architecture for pain, fear, and anxiety, according to which these three capacities are underpinned by a common threat‐detection mechanism . This mechanism takes information about potential threats as input, assesses whether the threat is actual and, if it deems it is, outputs a threat representation. If this is correct, pain, fear, and anxiety turn out to be different manifestations of the same cognitive mechanism. I defend my proposal by discussing a large swath of convergent evidence from different quarters of the sciences of the mind.