Pierre-Louis Cayrel

Pierre-Louis Cayrel

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Pierre-Louis Cayrel

Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, CNRS, Institut d’Optique Graduate School, Laboratoire Hubert Curien UMR 5516

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 September 2018 in Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GBGustavo Banegas
Gustavo Banegas
PBPaulo S. L. M. Barreto
Paulo S. L. M. Barreto
BBBrice Odilon Boidje
Brice Odilon Boidje
PCPierre-Louis Cayrel
Pierre-Louis Cayrel
GDGilbert Ndollane Dione
Gilbert Ndollane Dione
JRJefferson E. Ricardini
Jefferson E. Ricardini
Code-based cryptography is one of the main areas of interest for NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization call. In this paper, we introduce DAGS, a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) based on quasi-dyadic generalized Srivastava codes. The scheme is proved to be IND-CCA secure in both random oracle model and quantum random oracle model. We believe that DAGS will offer competitive performance, especially when compared with other existing code-based schemes, and represent a valid candidate for post-quantum standardization.

16 June 2021
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
PCPierre-Louis Cayrel
Pierre-Louis Cayrel
BCBrice Colombier
Brice Colombier
VDVlad Dragoi
Vlad Dragoi
AMAlexandre Menu
Alexandre Menu
LBLilian Bossuet
Lilian Bossuet

23 September 2014 in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ÖDÖzgür Dagdelen
Özgür Dagdelen
DGDavid Galindo
David Galindo
PVPascal Véron
Pascal Véron
SASidi Mohamed El Yousfi Alaoui
Sidi Mohamed El Yousfi Alaoui
PCPierre-Louis Cayrel
Pierre-Louis Cayrel

16 December 2025 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JKJUNAID AHMAD KHAN
JUNAID AHMAD KHAN
MKMuhammad Asif Khan
Muhammad Asif Khan
NSNasir Saeed
Nasir Saeed
PCPierre-Louis Cayrel
Pierre-Louis Cayrel
CHChanghee Hahn
Changhee Hahn
In-vehicle networks (IVNs) connect numerous sensors, processors, and Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to enable real-time communication, but their growing complexity has amplified cybersecurity concerns. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, along with its variants CAN-FD, CAN-XL, and complementary protocols such as LIN and FlexRay, remains the backbone of IVNs. However, these protocols (the CAN specifically) were not originally designed to meet the stringent security demands of emerging autonomous and electric vehicles. This survey critically examines existing IVN security literature with a particular focus on intrusion detection systems (IDS) developed for CAN-based architectures. Unlike prior reviews that emphasize algorithmic design or attack taxonomy, this survey provides a comparison of IDS approaches (typically CAN-based due to its dominance in industry and research domain) based on physical-layer features, statistical parameters, information theory, and learning-based methods. We highlight unresolved security limitations of the CAN bus, synthesize mitigation strategies across industrial domains (automotive, aerospace, marine, agricultural, and battery systems), and identify overlooked challenges. Finally, we outline key research frontiers, such as hardware-assisted protection, edge intelligence, blockchainbased authentication, generative AI-driven anomaly detection, and quantum-safe cryptography—toward building resilient next-generation IVNs.

11 August 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BCBrice Colombier
Brice Colombier
VDVlad Dragoi
Vlad Dragoi
PCPierre-Louis Cayrel
Pierre-Louis Cayrel
VGVincent Grosso
Vincent Grosso
The NIST standardization process for post-quantum cryptography has been drawing the attention of researchers to the submitted candidates. One direction of research consists in implementing those candidates on embedded systems and that exposes them to physical attacks in return. The Classic McEliece cryptosystem, which is among the four finalists of round 3 in the Key Encapsulation Mechanism category, builds its security on the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem, which is a classic hard problem in code-based cryptography. This cryptosystem was recently targeted by a laser fault injection attack leading to message recovery. Regrettably, the attack setting is very restrictive and it does not tolerate any error in the faulty syndrome. Moreover, it depends on the very strong attacker model of laser fault injection, and does not apply to optimised implementations of the algorithm that make optimal usage of the machine words capacity. In this article, we propose a to change the angle and perform a message-recovery attack that relies on side-channel information only. We improve on the previously published work in several key aspects. First, we show that side-channel information, obtained with power consumption analysis, is sufficient to obtain an integer syndrome, as required by the attack framework. This is done by leveraging classic machine learning techniques that recover the Hamming weight information very accurately. Second, we put forward a computationally-efficient method, based on a simple dot product and information-set decoding algorithms, to recover the message from the, possibly inaccurate, recovered integer syndrome. Finally, we present a masking countermeasure against the proposed attack.

2 December 2016 in International Journal of Computers Communications & Control
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DBDominic Bucerzan
Dominic Bucerzan
PCPierre-Louis Cayrel
Pierre-Louis Cayrel
VDVlad Dragoi
Vlad Dragoi
TRTania Richmond
Tania Richmond
Improved Timing Attacks against the Secret Permutation in the McEliece PKC