The last decade has seen the emergence of alternative sources of early-stage finance, which are radically changing and reshaping the start-up eco-system. These include incubators, accelerators, science and technology parks, university-affiliated seed funds, corporate seed funds, business angels – including “super-angels”, angel groups, business angel networks and angel investment funds – and both equity- and debt-based crowdfunding platforms. In parallel with this development, large financial institutions that have traditionally invested in late-stage and mature companies, have increasingly diversified their investment portfolios to “get into the venture game”, in some cases, through the traditional closed-end funds model and, in other cases through direct investments and co-investments alongside the closed-end funds. This paper reviews the main features, investment policies and risk-return profiles of the institutional and informal investors operating in the very early stage of the life cycle of entrepreneurial firms. It concludes that traditional closed-end venture capital funds continue to play an important role in early stage finance because of their unique competences (e.g. screening, negotiating and monitoring) in what has become a wider and more complex financing ecosystem.
Digitization creates new financial channels that complement traditional intermediaries, but may raise concerns over fraud, cybersecurity, or bubbles. Artificial intelligence and machine learning change the way in which traditional investors work. This special issue focuses on economic, cultural, and regulatory determinants of fintech development, and on the new forms of information production and processing engendered by digital entrepreneurial finance. We provide a general overview of digitization in the market for entrepreneurial finance, illustrate how the different articles in the special issue contribute to advance our knowledge, and identify promising avenues for research.
In this paper, we shed light on interactions among the various investors operating within the entrepreneurial finance ecosystem. Specifically, we aim to investigate what business angel (BA) investment practices are correlated with follow‐on venture capital (VC) financing, and uncover the strategies that determine a complementary‐based or a substitution‐based relationship with VCs. We analysed a sample of 176 companies that received a BA investment during 2008–2016 and collected financial data over a 10‐year period after the BA investment. The data examined indicate that BAs’ selectivity, as measured by their rejection rate, and BAs’ affiliation to an angel network, are positively related with the probability of raising follow‐on VC financing. However, a high level of BAs’ monitoring activity negatively influences the probability of obtaining VC funding. Interestingly, BA networks do affect this relationship. The positive impact of BAs’ rejection rate is informative for VC decisions if the BA does not invest through a network. Conversely, a high level of monitoring may convey a negative signal for VC, particularly if the BA is affiliated to a network. These results extend our knowledge of the investment practices of BAs and their role in allowing angel‐backed companies to raise follow‐on VC financing.
This study investigates whether the individual attributes and investment approaches of business angels (BAs) affect the growth of funded companies by distinguishing between two firm types: gazelles and ponies. We draw upon an original data set comprising 265 small Italian firms (49 that received BA financing and 216 in the propensity score matched control group). Building on insights drawn from the resource-based view and absorptive capacity theory, we find that BAs with entrepreneurial experience positively affect the sales growth of gazelles only. Moreover, the role of BAs’ investment experience and coaching in the growth rates of both gazelles and ponies is insignificant. Interestingly, monitoring helps boost ponies’ performance but stifles growth among gazelles.