Somesh Jha

Somesh Jha

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Somesh Jha

University of Wisconsin - Madison, Madison, WI, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

37Years (1990-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 December 2023 in Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CBClark Barrett
Clark Barrett
BBBrad Boyd
Brad Boyd
EBElie Bursztein
Elie Bursztein
NCNicholas Carlini
Nicholas Carlini
BCBrad Chen
Brad Chen
DYDiyi Yang
Diyi Yang
Every major technical invention resurfaces the dual-use dilemma—the new technology has the potential to be used for good as well as for harm. Generative AI (GenAI) techniques, such as large language models (LLMs) and diffusion models, have shown remarkable capabilities (e.g., in-context learning, code-completion, and text-to-image generation and editing). However, GenAI can be used just as well by attackers to generate new attacks and increase the velocity and efficacy of existing attacks. This monograph reports the findings of a workshop held at Google (co-organized by Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin-Madison) on the dual-use dilemma posed by GenAI. This work is not meant to be comprehensive, but is rather an attempt to synthesize some of the interesting findings from the workshop. We discuss short-term and long-term goals for the community on this topic. We hope this work provides both a launching point for a discussion on this important topic as well as interesting problems that the research community can work to address.

9 July 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TWTianhao Wang
Tianhao Wang
NLNinghui Li
Ninghui Li
SJSomesh Jha
Somesh Jha
The notion of Local Differential Privacy (LDP) enables users to answer sensitive questions while preserving their privacy. The basic LDP frequency oracle protocol enables the aggregator to estimate the frequency of any value. But when the domain of input values is large, finding the most frequent values, also known as the heavy hitters, by estimating the frequencies of all possible values, is computationally infeasible. In this paper, we propose an LDP protocol for identifying heavy hitters. In our proposed protocol, which we call Prefix Extending Method (PEM), users are divided into groups, with each group reporting a prefix of her value. We analyze how to choose optimal parameters for the protocol and identify two design principles for designing LDP protocols with high utility. Experiments show that under the same privacy guarantee and computational cost, PEM has better utility on both synthetic and real-world datasets than existing solutions.

29 March 2001
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
ECEdmund Clarke
Edmund Clarke
OGOrna Grumberg
Orna Grumberg
SJSomesh Jha
Somesh Jha
YLYuan Lu
Yuan Lu
HVHelmut Veith
Helmut Veith

13 January 2025 in IACR Communications in Cryptology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JFJaiden Fairoze
Jaiden Fairoze
SGSanjam Garg
Sanjam Garg
SJSomesh Jha
Somesh Jha
SMSaeed Mahloujifar
Saeed Mahloujifar
MMMohammad Mahmoody
Mohammad Mahmoody
MWMingyuan Wang
Mingyuan Wang
We present a publicly-detectable watermarking scheme for LMs: the detection algorithm contains no secret information, and it is executable by anyone. We embed a publicly-verifiable cryptographic signature into LM output using rejection sampling and prove that this produces unforgeable and distortion-free (i.e., undetectable without access to the public key) text output. We make use of error-correction to overcome periods of low entropy, a barrier for all prior watermarking schemes. We implement our scheme and find that our formal claims are met in practice.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SGSanjam Garg
Sanjam Garg
AGAarushi Goel
Aarushi Goel
SJSomesh Jha
Somesh Jha
SMSaeed Mahloujifar
Saeed Mahloujifar
MMMohammad Mahmoody
Mohammad Mahmoody
MWMingyuan Wang
Mingyuan Wang

22 October 2019 in Journal of Computer Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SYSamuel Yeom
Samuel Yeom
IGIrene Giacomelli
Irene Giacomelli
AMAlan Menaged
Alan Menaged
MFMatt Fredrikson
Matt Fredrikson
SJSomesh Jha
Somesh Jha
Machine learning algorithms, when applied to sensitive data, pose a distinct threat to privacy. A growing body of prior work demonstrates that models produced by these algorithms may leak specific private information in the training data to an attacker, either through the models’ structure or their observable behavior. This article examines the factors that can allow a training set membership inference attacker or an attribute inference attacker to learn such information. Using both formal and empirical analyses, we illustrate a clear relationship between these factors and the privacy risk that arises in several popular machine learning algorithms. We find that overfitting is sufficient to allow an attacker to perform membership inference and, when the target attribute meets certain conditions about its influence, attribute inference attacks. We also explore the connection between membership inference and attribute inference, showing that there are deep connections between the two that lead to effective new attacks. We show that overfitting is not necessary for these attacks, demonstrating that other factors, such as robustness to norm-bounded input perturbations and malicious training algorithms, can also significantly increase the privacy risk. Notably, as robustness is intended to be a defense against attacks on the integrity of model predictions, these results suggest it may be difficult in some cases to simultaneously defend against privacy and integrity attacks.