Thibault Cholez

Thibault Cholez

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Thibault Cholez

Université de Lorraine, CNRS, Inria, LORIA, Nancy, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
WSWazen M. Shbair
Wazen M. Shbair
TCThibault Cholez
Thibault Cholez
JFJerome Francois
Jerome Francois
ICIsabelle Chrisment
Isabelle Chrisment
The development of TLS-based encrypted traffic comes with new challenges related to the management and security analysis of encrypted traffic. There is an essential need for new methods to investigate, with a proper level of identification, the increasing number of HTTPS traffic that may hold security breaches. In fact, although many approaches detect the type of an application (Web, P2P, SSH, etc.) running in secure tunnels, and others identify a couple of specific encrypted web pages through website fingerprinting, this paper proposes a robust technique to precisely identify the services run within HTTPS connections, i.e. to name the services, without relying on specific header fields that can be easily altered. We have defined dedicated features for HTTPS traffic that are used as input for a multi-level identification framework based on machine learning algorithms. Our evaluation based on real traffic shows that we can identify encrypted web services with a high accuracy.

17 February 2023 in Journal of Network and Systems Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
XMXavier Marchal
Xavier Marchal
PGPhilippe Graff
Philippe Graff
JKJoël Roman Ky
Joël Roman Ky
TCThibault Cholez
Thibault Cholez
STStéphane Tuffin
Stéphane Tuffin
OFOlivier Festor
Olivier Festor

29 July 2022 in Journal of Network and Systems Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JEJean-Philippe Eisenbarth
Jean-Philippe Eisenbarth
TCThibault Cholez
Thibault Cholez
OPOlivier Perrin
Olivier Perrin

1 May 2010
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
TCT. Cholez
T. Cholez
ICI. Chrisment
I. Chrisment
OFO. Festor
O. Festor
We propose a new distributed architecture that aims to investigate and control the spread of contents in the KAD P2P network through the indexation of keywords and files. Our solution can control the DHT at a local level with a new strategy bypassing the Sybil attack protections inserted in KAD. For the targeted DHT entries, we can monitor all requests emitted by the peers, from the initial content publication or search, to the final download request of fake files, assessing accurately peers interest to access it. We demonstrate the efficiency of our approach through experiments performed on the worldwide KAD network.

9 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JKJoël Roman Ky
Joël Roman Ky
PGPhilippe Graff
Philippe Graff
BMBertrand Mathieu
Bertrand Mathieu
TCThibault Cholez
Thibault Cholez
Low-Iatency (LL) applications, such as the increasingly popular cloud gaming (CG) services, have stringent latency requirements. Recent network technologies such as L4S (Low Latency Low Loss Scalable throughput) propose to optimize the transport of LL traffic and require efficient ways to identify it. A previous work proposed a supervised machine learning model to identify CG traffic but it suffers from limited processing rate due to a pure software approach and a lack of generalization. In this paper, we propose a hybrid P4/NFV architecture, where a hardware Tofino based P4 implementation of the feature extraction functionality is deployed in the data plane and a unsupervised model is used to improve classification results. Our solution has a better processing rate while maintaining an excellent identification accuracy thanks to model adaptations to cope with P4 limitations and can be deployed at ISP level to reliably identify the CG traffic at line rate.

30 July 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
TCThibault Cholez
Thibault Cholez
CIClaudia-Lavinia Ignat
Claudia-Lavinia Ignat
The Distributed Hash Table (DHT) architecture is known to be a very efficient way to implement peer-to-peer (P2P) computer networks. However, the scientific literature also proved that DHT functioning in P2P networks can be easily disrupted by a single entity controlling many peers, known as the Sybil Attack. Various defensive mechanisms are known to prevent such attacks, or at least hinder them. The current study evaluates the resiliency of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) P2P network to a legacy Sybil Attack. We show that, surprisingly, IPFS does not implement basic defense mechanisms, allowing the most simple attack from a single computer to easily take the control of any DHT entry. A practical use of this attack is to almost entirely deny access to a given content on the network. Thus we provide some recommendations to quickly remediate this vulnerability.