Ulaş Özen

Ulaş Özen

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Ulaş Özen

Ozyegin University, Istanbul, Turkey

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2008 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
UÖUlaş Özen
Ulaş Özen
Jan FransooJan Fransoo
Jan Fransoo
HNHenk Norde
Henk Norde
MSMarco Slikker
Marco Slikker
This study considers a supply chain that consists of n retailers, each facing a newsvendor problem, and m warehouses. The retailers are supplied with a single product via some warehouses. In these warehouses, the ordered amounts of goods of these retailers become available after some lead time. At the time that the goods arrive at the warehouses, demand realizations are known by the retailers. The retailers can increase their expected joint profits if they can coordinate their orders and make allocations after demand realization. For this setting, we consider an associated cooperative game between the retailers. We show that this associated cooperative game has a nonempty core. Finally, we introduce a noncooperative game, where the retailers decide on their order quantities individually, and show that the set of payoff vectors resulting from strong Nash equilibria corresponds to the core of the associated cooperative game.

1 December 2011 in European Journal of Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
STS. Armagan Tarim
S. Armagan Tarim
MDMustafa K. Dogˇru
Mustafa K. Dogˇru
UÖUlaş Özen
Ulaş Özen
RRRoberto Rossi
Roberto Rossi

1 June 2012 in Omega
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
UÖUlaş Özen
Ulaş Özen
MDMustafa K. Doğru
Mustafa K. Doğru
STS. Armagan Tarim
S. Armagan Tarim

1 September 2011 in Operations Research Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
UÖUlaş Özen
Ulaş Özen
MRMartin I. Reiman
Martin I. Reiman
QWQiong Wang
Qiong Wang

1 April 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
MAMatthew Andrews
Matthew Andrews
UOUlas Ozen
Ulas Ozen
MRMartin I. Reiman
Martin I. Reiman
QWQiong Wang
Qiong Wang
The interaction of a content provider with end users on an infrastructure platform built and maintained by a service provider can be viewed as a two-sided market. Content sponsoring, i.e., charging the content provider instead of viewers for resources consumed in viewing the content, can benefit all parties involved. Without being charged directly or having it counted against their monthly data quotas, end users will view more content, allowing the content provider to generate more advertising revenue, extracted by the service provider to subsidize its investment and operation of the network infrastructure. However, realizing such gains requires a proper contractual relationship between the service provider and content provider. We consider the determination of this contract through a Stackelberg game. The service provider sets a pricing schedule for sponsoring and the content provider responds by deciding how much content to sponsor. We analyze the best strategies for the content provider and service provider in the event that the underlying demand for the content is uncertain. Two separate settings are defined. In the first, end users can be charged for non-sponsored views on a per-byte basis. In the second we extend the model to the more common case in which end users purchase data quotas on a periodic basis. Our main conclusion is that a coordinating contract can be designed that maximizes total system profit. Moreover, the additional profit due to sponsoring can be split between the content provider and service provider in an arbitrary manner.

1 February 2012 in European Journal of Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
UÖUlaş Özen
Ulaş Özen
GSGreys Sošić
Greys Sošić
MSMarco Slikker
Marco Slikker