17 November 2017 in Risk Analysis
1 July 2019 in Transport Policy
8 February 2016 in Risk Analysis
15 November 2019 in Risk Analysis
11 May 2017 in Proceedings of the IEEE
Hurricanes produce significant, widespread, and often prolonged electrical-power outages. For example, Hurricane Irene caused more than 500 000 Long Island Power Authority customers to lose power and it took eight days to achieve 99% customer restoration. Individuals and businesses are heavily dependent on a continuous supply of electricity. Given this strong dependence on reliable electricity, individuals and private industries are increasingly putting collective pressure on regulators to require system hardening by utilities. In some cases, this has led to utility action. Conversely, many customers install a backup generator to guarantee electricity supply during disruptive events. These actions taken by individual customers affect their experiences in future storms, and are generally influenced by individuals' strength of preference for reliable power, their beliefs about the likelihood of losing power in the future, and the outcomes of their most recent experiences. However, individual action may come at the expense of collective action, whereby those who buy generators, often those with more resources available to purchase the generator, do not participate in the collective grievance, reducing the demand for overall system hardening. By using a validated power-outage forecasting model in conjunction with an agent-based model, we characterize how a community's likelihood of losing power in repeated hurricanes is affected by the complex interactions among individuals' behavioral responses in whether to engage in personal or collective action.
1 March 2020 in Journal of Infrastructure Systems
This paper describes a case study performed with the US passenger rail service provider Amtrak that developed a metrics framework to measure resilience to climate risk within their Northeast Corridor operations systems and to track changes in resilience over time. Amtrak representatives reviewed metrics and selected those most relevant and also most feasible to measure and implement at Amtrak. Twenty-one metrics, termed resilience activities, focused on technical and organizational (leadership and readiness) resilience; key outcomes to measure following a disruption were identified as cost, safety, customer satisfaction, organizational development, and on-time performance. Resilience activities were scored to serve as a baseline for assessing resilience in the future. While many researchers have generated frameworks or resilience metrics, few published examples of metrics implementation in infrastructure systems are available. Amtrak appears to be progressive in their use of resilience metrics and participated in this process to improve resilience awareness within their organization and identify areas for improvement. Analysis of baseline scoring of resilience activities indicates that Amtrak assesses itself as being relatively more resilient toward climate change risk from an organizational readiness capacity than from an organizational leadership capacity or a technical capacity. Future research may include the tracking of metrics following a disruption and a periodic reassessment of resilience activity scores.