David Paul-Pena

David Paul-Pena

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David Paul-Pena

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, New York University Tandon School of Engineering, Brooklyn, NY, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 May 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PKPrashanth Krishnamurthy
Prashanth Krishnamurthy
FKFarshad Khorrami
Farshad Khorrami
RKRamesh Karri
Ramesh Karri
DPDavid Paul-Pena
David Paul-Pena
HSHossein Salehghaffari
Hossein Salehghaffari
We propose using the analog emissions of physical instrumentation (e.g., actuators, sensors, and mechanical structures) in a cyber-physical system (CPS) to send or leak information without impacting the CPS process characteristics. We show that one can use the analog emissions as covert channels to send information to a remote receiver without altering the functioning of the CPS by considering the dynamics of the controller and its closed-loop characteristics. We demonstrate the control-theoretic approach using the Tennessee Eastman (TE) controller benchmark implemented in a hardware-in-the-loop simulator. Two feedback loops (out of 18) in the TE process are implemented on a programmable logic controller (PLC) driving a geared motor. Assuming that a malware has compromised this PLC, we show that the malware can use the acoustic emissions of a motor controlling a valve in a feedback control loop as a covert channel. This secret transmission over the covert acoustic channel can be done without affecting the stability, performance, and signal characteristics of the closed-loop process. An attacker can exfiltrate sensitive information, such as the proprietary gains or the thresholds used in the controller and the system passwords using covert channels.