Steve Clarke

Steve Clarke

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Steve Clarke

School of Social Work and Arts, Charles Sturt University, Wagga Wagga, New South Wales, Australia

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

32Years (1995-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2002 in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
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SCSteve Clarke
Steve Clarke
The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticism toward the theories propounded by conspiracy theorists, because conspiracy theorists have an irrational tendency to continue to believe in conspiracy theories, even when these take on the appearance of forming the core of degenerating research program. It is further argued that the pervasive effect of the “fundamental attribution error” can explain the behavior of such conspiracy theorists. A rival approach due to Brian Keeley, which involves the criticism of a subclass of conspiracy theories on epistemic grounds, is considered and found to be inadequate.

1 September 2005 in Ethics and Information Technology
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SCSteve Clarke
Steve Clarke

2 January 2012 in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
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RPRussell Powell
Russell Powell
SCSteve Clarke
Steve Clarke
The dominant view in the cognitive science of religion (the ‘Standard Model’) is that religious belief and behaviour are not adaptive traits but rather incidental byproducts of the cognitive architecture of mind. Because evidence for the Standard Model is inconclusive, the case for it depends crucially on its alleged methodological superiority to selectionist alternatives. However, we show that the Standard Model has both methodological and evidential disadvantages when compared with selectionist alternatives. We also consider a pluralistic approach, which holds that religion or various aspects of religion originated as byproducts of evolved cognitive structures but were subsequently co-opted for adaptive purposes. We argue that when properly formulated, the pluralistic approach also has certain advantages over the Standard Model.

1 February 2004 in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
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SCSteve Clarke
Steve Clarke
JOJustin Oakley
Justin Oakley
This paper argues that the provision of effective informed consent by surgical patients requires the disclosure of material information about the comp

2 July 2009 in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
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SCSteve Clarke
Steve Clarke
AWAdrian Walsh
Adrian Walsh
John Dupré argues that ‘scientific imperialism’ can result in ‘misguided’ science being considered acceptable. ‘Misguided’ is an explicitly normative term and the use of the pejorative ‘imperialistic’ is implicitly normative. However, Dupré has not justified the normative dimension of his critique. We identify two ways in which it might be justified. It might be justified if colonisation prevents a discipline from progressing in ways that it might otherwise progress. It might also be justified if colonisation prevents the expression of important values in the colonised discipline. This second concern seems most pressing in the human sciences.

23 December 2016 in Bioethics
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SCSteve Clarke
Steve Clarke
AGAlberto Giubilini
Alberto Giubilini
MWMary Jean Walker
Mary Jean Walker
Vaccine refusal occurs for a variety of reasons. In this article we examine vaccine refusals that are made on conscientious grounds; that is, for religious, moral, or philosophical reasons. We focus on two questions: first, whether people should be entitled to conscientiously object to vaccination against contagious diseases (either for themselves or for their children); second, if so, to what constraints or requirements should conscientious objection (CO) to vaccination be subject. To address these questions, we consider an analogy between CO to vaccination and CO to military service. We argue that conscientious objectors to vaccination should make an appropriate contribution to society in lieu of being vaccinated. The contribution to be made will depend on the severity of the relevant disease(s), its morbidity, and also the likelihood that vaccine refusal will lead to harm. In particular, the contribution required will depend on whether the rate of CO in a given population threatens herd immunity to the disease in question: for severe or highly contagious diseases, if the population rate of CO becomes high enough to threaten herd immunity, the requirements for CO could become so onerous that CO, though in principle permissible, would be de facto impermissible.