Stefanie I. Becker

Stefanie I. Becker

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Stefanie I. Becker

School of Psychology, University of Queensland

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2010 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
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Journal Article
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SBStefanie I. Becker
Stefanie I. Becker
Current models of visual search assume that visual attention can be guided by tuning attention toward specific feature values (e.g., particular size, color) or by inhibiting the features of the irrelevant nontargets. The present study demonstrates that attention and eye movements can also be guided by a relational specification of how the target differs from the irrelevant distractors (e.g., larger, redder, darker). Guidance by the relational properties of the target governed intertrial priming effects and capture by irrelevant distractors. First, intertrial switch costs occurred only upon reversals of the coarse relationship between target and nontargets, but they did not occur when the target and nontarget features changed such that the relation remained the same. Second, irrelevant distractors captured most strongly when they differed in the correct direction from all other items--despite the fact that they were less similar to the target. This suggests that priming and contingent capture, which have previously been regarded as prime evidence for feature-based selection, are really due to a relational selection mechanism. Here I propose a new relational vector account of guidance, which holds promise to synthesize a wide range of different findings that have previously been attributed to different mechanisms of visual search.

1 August 2012 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
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Journal Article
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DSDana Schneider
Dana Schneider
ABAndrew P. Bayliss
Andrew P. Bayliss
SBStefanie I. Becker
Stefanie I. Becker
PDPaul E. Dux
Paul E. Dux
The ability to attribute mental states to others is crucial for social competency. To assess mentalizing abilities, in false-belief tasks participants attempt to identify an actor's belief about an object's location as opposed to the object's actual location. Passing this test on explicit measures is typically achieved by 4 years of age, but recent eye movement studies reveal registration of others' beliefs by 7 to 15 months. Consequently, a 2-path mentalizing system has been proposed, consisting of a late developing, cognitively demanding component and an early developing, implicit/automatic component. To date, investigations on the implicit system have been based on single-trial experiments only or have not examined how it operates across time. In addition, no study has examined the extent to which participants are conscious of the belief states of others during these tasks. Thus, the existence of a distinct implicit mentalizing system is yet to be demonstrated definitively. Here we show that adults engaged in a primary unrelated task display eye movement patterns consistent with mental state attributions across a sustained temporal period. Debriefing supported the hypothesis that this mentalizing was implicit. It appears there indeed exists a distinct implicit mental state attribution system.

4 April 2013 in Psychological Science
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Journal Article
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SBStefanie I. Becker
Stefanie I. Becker
CFCharles L. Folk
Charles L. Folk
RRRoger W. Remington
Roger W. Remington
What factors determine which stimuli of a scene will be visually selected and become available for conscious perception? The currently prevalent view is that attention operates on specific feature values, so attention will be drawn to stimuli that have features similar to those of the sought-after target. Here, we show that, instead, attentional capture depends on whether a distractor’s feature relationships match the target-nontarget relations (e.g., redder). In three spatial-cuing experiments, we found that (a) a cue with the target color (e.g., orange) can fail to capture attention when the cue–cue-context relations do not match the target-nontarget relations (e.g., redder target vs. yellower cue), whereas (b) a cue with the nontarget color can capture attention when its relations match the target-nontarget relations (e.g., both are redder). These results support a relational account in which attention is biased toward feature relationships instead of particular feature values, and show that attentional capture by an irrelevant distractor does not depend on feature similarity, but rather depends on whether the distractor matches or mismatches the target’s relative attributes (e.g., relative color).

1 January 2007 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SBStefanie I. Becker
Stefanie I. Becker
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether costs invoked by the presence of an irrelevant singleton distractor in a visual search task are due to attentional capture by the irrelevant singleton or spatially unrelated filtering costs. Measures of spatial effects were based on distance effects, compatibility effects, and differences between singleton and nonsingleton target trials. The results show that the distractor only regularly captures attention when it is nonpredictive of the target position and unpredictably changes its features. When the distractor is antipredictive of the target position and the irrelevant features of target and distractor remain constant throughout the experiment, spatially unrelated filtering costs prevail. Further experiments showed that filtering costs accrue from distractor inhibition or target activation processes, which in turn can be modeled as instances of priming of pop-out. The present study thus clarifies the notion of filtering costs and modifies present accounts of the distraction effect. Moreover, the results also relate to research of intertrial priming by showing that priming affects the stage of attentional selection and depends on top-down attentional control settings.

1 January 2010 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SBStefanie I. Becker
Stefanie I. Becker
CFCharles L. Folk
Charles L. Folk
RRRoger W. Remington
Roger W. Remington
On the contingent capture account, top-down attentional control settings restrict involuntary attentional capture to items that match the features of the search target. Attention capture is involuntary, but contingent on goals and intentions. The observation that only target-similar items can capture attention has usually been taken to show that the content of the attentional control settings consists of specific feature values. In contrast, the present study demonstrates that the top-down target template can include information about the relationship between the target and nontarget features (e.g., redder, darker, larger). Several spatial cuing experiments show that a singleton cue that is less similar to the target but that shares the same relational property that distinguishes targets from nontargets can capture attention to the same extent as cues that are similar to the target. Moreover, less similar cues can even capture attention more than cues that are identical to the target when they are relationally better than identical cues. The implications for current theories of attentional capture and attentional guidance are discussed.

1 February 2013 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ABAndrew P. Bayliss
Andrew P. Bayliss
EMEmily Murphy
Emily Murphy
CNClaire K. Naughtin
Claire K. Naughtin
AKAda Kritikos
Ada Kritikos
LSLeonhard Schilbach
Leonhard Schilbach
SBStefanie I. Becker
Stefanie I. Becker
Recent research in adults has made great use of the gaze cuing paradigm to understand the behavior of the follower in joint attention episodes. We implemented a gaze leading task to investigate the initiator--the other person in these triadic interactions. In a series of gaze-contingent eye-tracking studies, we show that fixation dwell time upon and reorienting toward a face are affected by whether that individual face shifts its eyes in a congruent or an incongruent direction in response to the participant's eye movement. Gaze leading also biased affective responses toward the faces and attended objects. These findings demonstrate that leading the eyes of other individuals alters how we explore and evaluate our social environment.