1 July 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: We study a monopolistic robust pricing problem in which the seller does not know the customers’ valuation distribution for a product but knows its mean and variance. Academic/practical relevance: This minimal requirement for information means that the pricing managers only need to be able to answer two questions: How much will your targeted customers pay on average? To measure your confidence in the previous answer, what is the standard deviation of customer valuations? Methodology: We focus on the maximin profit criterion and derive distribution-free upper and lower bounds on the profit function. Results: By maximizing the tight profit lower bound, we obtain the optimal robust price in closed form as well as its distribution-free, worst-case performance bound. We then extend the single-product result to study the robust pure bundle pricing problem where the seller only knows the mean and variance of each product, and we provide easily verifiable, distribution-free, sufficient conditions that guarantee the pure bundle to be more robustly profitable than à la carte (i.e., separate) sales. We further derive a distribution-free, worst-case performance guarantee for a heuristic scheme in which customers choose between buying either a single product or a pure bundle. Moreover, we generalize separate sales and pure bundling to a scheme called clustered bundling that imposes a price for each part (i.e., cluster) of a partition of all products and allows customers to choose one or multiple parts (i.e., clusters), and we provide various algorithms to compute clustered bundling heuristics. In parallel, most of our results hold for the minimax relative regret criterion as well. Managerial implications: The robust price for a single product is in closed form under the maximin profit or minimax relative regret criterion and hence, is easily computable. Its interpretation can be easily explained to pricing managers. We also provide efficient algorithms to compute various mixed bundling heuristics for the multiproduct problem.
27 October 2021 in International Transactions in Operational Research
1 May 2023 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: The undesirable but inevitable consequence of running promotions is that consumers can be trained to time their purchases strategically. In this paper, we study randomized promotions, where the firm randomly offers discounts over time, as an alternative strategy of intertemporal price discrimination. Methodology/results: We consider a base model where a monopolist sells a single product to a market with a constant stream of two market segments. The segments are heterogeneous in both their product valuations and patience levels. The firm precommits to a price distribution, and in each period, a price is randomly drawn from the committed distribution. We characterize the optimal price distribution as a randomized promotion policy and show that it serves as an intertemporal price discrimination mechanism such that high-valuation customers would make a purchase immediately at a regular price upon arrival, and low-valuation customers would wait for a random promotion. Compared against the optimal cyclic pricing policy, which is optimal within the strategy space of all deterministic pricing policies, the optimal randomized pricing policy beats it if low-valuation customers are sufficiently patient and the absolute discrepancy between high and low customer valuations is large enough. We extend the model in three directions. First, we consider the case where a portion of customers are myopic and would never wait. We show that the existence of myopic customers is detrimental to the firm’s profitability, and the expected profit from an optimal randomized pricing policy decreases as the proportion of myopic customers in the population increases. Second, we consider Markovian pricing policies where prices are allowed to be intertemporally correlated in a Markovian fashion. This additional maneuver allows the firm to reap an even higher profit when low-valuation customers are sufficiently patient by avoiding consecutive promotions but, on average, running the promotion more frequently with a smaller discount size. Lastly, we consider a model with multiple customer segments and show that a two-point price distribution remains optimal, and our conclusion from the two-segment base model still holds under certain conditions that are adopted in the literature. Managerial implications: Our results imply that the firm may want to deliberately randomize promotions in the presence of forward-looking customers. Funding: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72201124], the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada [Grants RGPIN-2015-06757 and RGPIN-2021-04295], and the Youth Project of the Humanities and Social Science Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China [Grant 22YJC630006]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1194 .
4 February 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
This study explores optimal pricing in dual-channel retailing with return insurance, considering price differentiation across channels, consumer heterogeneity, and return behavior. Three prevalent return insurance scenarios are examined: (i) no return insurance (Scenario N), (ii) retailer's free return insurance (Scenario R) and (iii) consumers' purchasing return insurance (Scenario C). Findings first suggest that when a retailer offers free return insurance, it should set higher prices online compared to offline. Conversely, if no free return insurance is provided, lowering the online price can encourage more online sales. Interestingly, the impact of return insurance on pricing and demand is non-intuitive. When product value and consumers' return cost are high, the introduction of return insurance leads to price increases across both online and offline channels, and simultaneously boosts online demand. Finally, we also find that return insurance does not always improve profitability for the dual-channel retailer. The retailer only benefits from introducing return insurance if the product has high value and consumers face substantial return costs. The study highlights the role of return insurance as an important tool for dual-channel retailers when combined with strategic pricing.
11 February 2025 in Production and Operations Management
The resale of used products presents the challenge of cannibalization, particularly pronounced in digital goods markets where perfect substitutes are easily replicable. In this article, we assert that, rather than a threat, resale can serve as an effective pricing tool for managing heterogeneous demand. We consider a seller of digital goods/services who offers a contract to a heterogeneous group of customers at a fixed price for a specified amount of usage allowance. Rather than imposing restrictive sharing barriers, the seller allows subscribers to share their allowances with others in a secondary market. Our analysis reveals that the seller’s optimal strategy involves facilitating resale by eliminating transaction costs. The sharing contract effectively achieves the same outcome as a two-part tariff, wherein subscribers pay an entry fee along with a marginal usage rate. Both approaches generate equivalent revenue and market coverage, and result in idential demand and individual surplus for customers of the same type. Consequently, the sharing contract acts as a mechanism for price discrimination. Our finding provides a new perspective on peer-to-peer resales and also challenges the conventional belief that successful price discrimination hinges on preventing resale.
9 April 2025 in International Transactions in Operational Research