Roberto Carbone

Roberto Carbone

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Roberto Carbone

Center for Cybersecurity, FBK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 October 2008
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
AAAlessandro Armando
Alessandro Armando
RCRoberto Carbone
Roberto Carbone
LCLuca Compagna
Luca Compagna
JCJorge Cuellar
Jorge Cuellar
LTLlanos Tobarra
Llanos Tobarra
Single-Sign-On (SSO) protocols enable companies to establish a federated environment in which clients sign in the system once and yet are able to access to services offered by different companies. The OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile is the emerging standard in this context. In this paper we provide formal models of the protocol corresponding to one of the most applied use case scenario (the SP-Initiated SSO with Redirect/POST Bindings) and of a variant of the protocol implemented by Google and currently in use by Google's customers (the SAML-based SSO for Google Applications). We have mechanically analysed these formal models with SATMC, a state-of-the-art model checker for security protocols. SATMC has revealed a severe security flaw in the protocol used by Google that allows a dishonest service provider to impersonate a user at another service provider. We have also reproduced this attack in an actual deployment of the SAML-based SSO for Google Applications. This security flaw of the SAML-based SSO for Google Applications was previously unknown.

1 August 2020 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FSFederico Sinigaglia
Federico Sinigaglia
RCRoberto Carbone
Roberto Carbone
GCGabriele Costa
Gabriele Costa
Nicola ZannoneNicola Zannone
Nicola Zannone

1 January 2012
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
AAAlessandro Armando
Alessandro Armando
WAWihem Arsac
Wihem Arsac
TATigran Avanesov
Tigran Avanesov
MBMichele Barletta
Michele Barletta
ACAlberto Calvi
Alberto Calvi
LVLuca Viganò
Luca Viganò

1 March 2013 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AAAlessandro Armando
Alessandro Armando
RCRoberto Carbone
Roberto Carbone
LCLuca Compagna
Luca Compagna
JCJorge Cuéllar
Jorge Cuéllar
GPGiancarlo Pellegrino
Giancarlo Pellegrino
ASAlessandro Sorniotti
Alessandro Sorniotti

10 December 2022 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ASAmir Sharif
Amir Sharif
MRMattel Ranzi
Mattel Ranzi
RCRoberto Carbone
Roberto Carbone
GSGiada Sciarretta
Giada Sciarretta
FMFrancesco Antonio Marino
Francesco Antonio Marino
SRSilvio Ranise
Silvio Ranise
The eIDAS regulation aims to provide an interoperable European framework to enable EU citizens to authenticate and communicate with services of other Member States by using their national electronic identity. While a number of high-level requirements (e.g., related to privacy and security) are established to make interoperability among Member States possible, the eIDAS regulation does not explicitly specify the technologies that can be adopted during the development phase to meet the requirements as mentioned earlier. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work available in the literature investigating the technological trends within the notified eIDAS electronic identity schemes used by Member States. To fill this gap, this paper analyzes how the different technological trends of notified schemes satisfy the requirements of the eIDAS regulation. To do this, we define a set of research questions that allow us to investigate the correlations between different design dimensions such as security, privacy, and usability. Based on these findings, we provide a set of lessons learned that would be valuable to the security community, as they can provide useful insights on how to more efficiently protect interoperable national digital identities. Furthermore, we provide a brief overview regarding the new eIDAS regulation (eIDAS 2.0) that aims to provide a more privacy-preserving electronic identity solution by moving from a centralized approach to a decentralized one.

1 July 2007
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
AAAlessandro Armando
Alessandro Armando
RCRoberto Carbone
Roberto Carbone
LCLuca Compagna
Luca Compagna
Most model checking techniques for security protocols make a number of simplifying assumptions on the protocol and/or on its execution environment that prevent their applicability in some important cases. For instance, most techniques assume that communication between honest principals is controlled by a Dolev -Yao intruder, i.e. a malicious agent capable to overhear, divert, and fake messages. Yet we might be interested in establishing the security of a protocol that relies on a less unsecure channel (e.g. a confidential channel provided by some other protocol sitting lower in the protocol stack). In this paper we propose a general model for security protocols based on the set-rewriting formalism that, coupled with the use of LTL, allows for the specification of assumptions on principals and communication channels as well as complex security properties that are normally not handled by state-of-the-art protocol analysers. By using our approach we have been able to formalise all the assumptions required by the ASW protocol for optimistic fair exchange as well as some of its security properties. Besides the previously reported attacks on the protocol, we report a new attack on a patched version of the protocol.