Matthew Edwards

Matthew Edwards

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Matthew Edwards

School of Computer Science University of Bristol Bristol UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2018 in Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FUFaheem Ullah
Faheem Ullah
MEMatthew Edwards
Matthew Edwards
RRRajiv Ramdhany
Rajiv Ramdhany
RCRuzanna Chitchyan
Ruzanna Chitchyan
MBM. Ali Babar
M. Ali Babar
ARAwais Rashid
Awais Rashid

22 July 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Guillermo Suárez-TangilGuillermo Suárez-Tangil
Guillermo Suárez-Tangil
MEMatthew Edwards
Matthew Edwards
CPClaudia Peersman
Claudia Peersman
GSGianluca Stringhini
Gianluca Stringhini
ARAwais Rashid
Awais Rashid
MWMonica Whitty
Monica Whitty
Online romance scams are a prevalent form of massmarketing fraud in the West, and yet few studies have presented data-driven responses to this problem. In this type of scam, fraudsters craft fake profiles and manually interact with their victims. Because of the characteristics of this type of fraud and of how dating sites operate, traditional detection methods (e.g., those used in spam filtering) are ineffective. In this paper, we investigate the archetype of online dating profiles used in this form of fraud, including their use of demographics, profile descriptions, and images, shedding light on both the strategies deployed by scammers to appeal to victims and the traits of victims themselves. Further, in response to the severe financial and psychological harm caused by dating fraud, we develop a system to detect romance scammers on online dating platforms. Our work presents the first fully described system for automatically detecting this fraud. Our aim is to provide an early detection system to stop romance scammers as they create fraudulent profiles or before they engage with potential victims. Previous research has indicated that the victims of romance scams score highly on scales for idealized romantic beliefs. We combine a range of structured, unstructured, and deep-learned features that capture these beliefs in order to build a detection system. Our ensemble machine-learning approach is robust to the omission of profile details and performs at high accuracy (97%) in a holdout validation set. The system enables development of automated tools for dating site providers and individual users.

1 August 2017 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MEMatthew Edwards
Matthew Edwards
RLRobert Larson
Robert Larson
BGBenjamin Green
Benjamin Green
ARAwais Rashid
Awais Rashid
ABAlistair Baron
Alistair Baron
The process of social engineering targets people rather than IT infrastructure. Attackers use deceptive ploys to create compelling behavioural and cosmetic hooks, which in turn lead a target to disclose sensitive information or to interact with a malicious payload. The creation of such hooks requires background information on targets. Individuals are increasingly releasing information about themselves online, particularly on social networks. Though existing research has demonstrated the social engineering risks posed by such open source intelligence, this has been accomplished either through resource-intensive manual analysis or via interactive information harvesting techniques. As manual analysis of large-scale online information is impractical, and interactive methods risk alerting the target, alternatives are desirable. In this paper, we demonstrate that key information pertinent to social engineering attacks on organisations can be passively harvested on a large-scale in an automated fashion. We address two key problems. We demonstrate that it is possible to automatically identify employees of an organisation using only information which is visible to a remote attacker as a member of the public. Secondly, we show that, once identified, employee profiles can be linked across multiple online social networks to harvest additional information pertinent to successful social engineering attacks. We further demonstrate our approach through analysis of the social engineering attack surface of real critical infrastructure organisations. Based on our analysis we propose a set of countermeasures including an automated social engineering vulnerability scanner that organisations can use to analyse their exposure to potential social engineering attacks arising from open source intelligence

29 September 2015 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MEMatthew Edwards
Matthew Edwards
ARAwais Rashid
Awais Rashid
PRPaul Rayson
Paul Rayson
As an increasing amount of crime takes on a digital aspect, law enforcement bodies must tackle an online environment generating huge volumes of data. With manual inspections becoming increasingly infeasible, law enforcement bodies are optimising online investigations through data-mining technologies. Such technologies must be well designed and rigorously grounded, yet no survey of the online data-mining literature exists which examines their techniques, applications and rigour. This article remedies this gap through a systematic mapping study describing online data-mining literature which visibly targets law enforcement applications, using evidence-based practices in survey making to produce a replicable analysis which can be methodologically examined for deficiencies.

14 May 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
ARAwais Rashid
Awais Rashid
SNSyed Asad Ali Naqvi
Syed Asad Ali Naqvi
RRRajiv Ramdhany
Rajiv Ramdhany
MEMatthew Edwards
Matthew Edwards
RCRuzanna Chitchyan
Ruzanna Chitchyan
MBM. Ali Babar
M. Ali Babar
Security is one of the biggest challenges facing organisations in the modern hyper-connected world. A number of theoretical security models are available that provide best practice security guidelines and are widely utilised as a basis to identify and operationalise security requirements. Such models often capture high-level security concepts (e.g., whitelisting, secure configurations, wireless access control, data recovery, etc.), strategies for operationalising such concepts through specific security controls, and relationships between the various concepts and controls. The threat landscape, however, evolves leading to new tacit knowledge that is embedded in or across a variety of security incidents. These unknown knowns alter, or at least demand reconsideration of the theoretical security models underpinning security requirements. In this paper, we present an approach to discover such unknown knowns through multi-incident analysis. The approach is based on a novel combination of grounded theory and incident fault trees. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach through its application to identify revisions to a theoretical security model widely used in industry.Awais Rashid, Syed Asad Ali Naqvi, Rajiv Ramdhany, Matthew Edwards, Ruzanna Chitchyan, M. Ali Baba

14 September 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BSBenjamin Shreeve
Benjamin Shreeve
JHJoseph Hallett
Joseph Hallett
MEMatthew Edwards
Matthew Edwards
KRKopo M. Ramokapane
Kopo M. Ramokapane
RARichard Atkins
Richard Atkins
ARAwais Rashid
Awais Rashid
Cyber security requirements are influenced by the priorities and decisions of a range of stakeholders. Board members and Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) determine strategic priorities. Managers have responsibility for resource allocation and project management. Legal professionals concern themselves with regulatory compliance. Little is understood about how the security decision-making approaches of these different stakeholders contrast, and if particular groups of stakeholders have a better appreciation of security requirements during decision-making. Are risk analysts better decision makers than CISOs? Do security experts exhibit more effective strategies than board members? This paper explores the effect that different experience and diversity of expertise has on the quality of a team's cyber security decision-making and whether teams with members from more varied backgrounds perform better than those with more focused, homogeneous skill sets. Using data from 208 sessions and 948 players of a tabletop game run in the wild by a major national organization over 16 months, we explore how choices are affected by player background (e.g., cyber security experts versus risk analysts, board-level decision makers versus technical experts) and different team make-ups (homogeneous teams of security experts versus various mixes). We find that no group of experts makes significantly better game decisions than anyone else, and that their biases lead them to not fully comprehend what they are defending or how the defenses work.