1 January 2016 in Journal of Arid Environments
In Namibia, rural water governance has changed profoundly during the last two decades. Today, in many rural communities, user associations administer water and set the rules for management practices. Their rules typically define boundaries and specify contributions that vary for members and outsiders. When the rains failed in 2012–14, the mobility of people and herds increased and put the newly formed institutional regimes to a critical test. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in seven communities, we examine whether and how management regimes were either altered or applied. The results indicate that cultural models of kinship and reciprocity took priority over formal agreements during the drought. Non-adherence to formalized practices and to rules of excluding outsiders also expresses a certain resistance to the interpretation of water as an economic good
1 January 1998 in Social Networks
1 June 2005 in Human Nature
1 April 2015 in World Development
SummarySanctions are often considered an important component of successful resource management. To govern water usage, pastoral communities in Namibia have specific sanctions at their disposal and yet these are almost never applied. Interestingly, this does not lead to a breakdown in water supply. To understand collective action in small communities it is important to take into account that people share multiple resources. Combining ethnography and network analysis we reveal that people cannot separate the sharing of water from the sharing of ancestries, food, and work. This discourages the application of formal sanctions while opening other means of maintaining institutional regimes
16 February 2016 in AMBIO
In the course of decentralization, pastoral communities in Namibia have had to find new ways to share their most salient resource, water, and the costs involved in providing it. Using data from sixty communities, we examine (1) whether and to what extent different sharing rules emerge, (2) how variations can be explained, (3) how rules are perceived and influence success, and (4) what economic consequences they have. Our results reveal that either all members pay the same (numerical equality) or payment is according to usage (proportional equality). We find that although proportional equality provides more success, the rule can only pertain where the state maintains an active role. Simulations show that where it does not prevail, wealth inequality is likely to grow. These findings have political implications and suggest that, in the context of the widespread decentralization policies, the state should not withdraw if it aims to ensure the success of common-pool resource management and to fight poverty.