Katherine Davis

Katherine Davis

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Katherine Davis

Texas A&M University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 October 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
OBOsman Boyaci
Osman Boyaci
MNMohammad Rasoul Narimani
Mohammad Rasoul Narimani
KDKatherine R. Davis
Katherine R. Davis
Muhammad IsmailMuhammad Ismail
Muhammad Ismail
TOThomas J. Overbye
Thomas J. Overbye
ESErchin Serpedin
Erchin Serpedin
False data injection attacks (FDIA) are a main category of cyber-attacks threatening the security of power systems. Contrary to the detection of these attacks, less attention has been paid to identifying the attacked units of the grid. To this end, this work jointly studies detecting and localizing the stealth FDIA in power grids. Exploiting the inherent graph topology of power systems as well as the spatial correlations of measurement data, this paper proposes an approach based on the graph neural network (GNN) to identify the presence and location of the FDIA. The proposed approach leverages the auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) type graph filters (GFs) which can better adapt to sharp changes in the spectral domain due to their rational type filter composition compared to the polynomial type GFs such as Chebyshev. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work based on GNN that automatically detects and localizes FDIA in power systems. Extensive simulations and visualizations show that the proposed approach outperforms the available methods in both detection and localization of FDIA for different IEEE test systems. Thus, the targeted areas can be identified and preventive actions can be taken before the attack impacts the grid.

20 October 2021 in IEEE Systems Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
OBOsman Boyaci
Osman Boyaci
AUAmarachi Umunnakwe
Amarachi Umunnakwe
ASAbhijeet Sahu
Abhijeet Sahu
MNMohammad Rasoul Narimani
Mohammad Rasoul Narimani
Muhammad IsmailMuhammad Ismail
Muhammad Ismail
ESErchin Serpedin
Erchin Serpedin
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) represent a major class of attacks that aim to break the integrity of measurements by injecting false data into the smart metering devices in power grids. To the best of authors’ knowledge, no study has attempted to design a detector that automatically models the underlying graph topology and spatially correlated measurement data of the smart grids to better detect cyber attacks. The contributions of this article to detect and mitigate FDIAs are twofold. First, we present a generic, localized, and stealth (unobservable) attack generation methodology and publicly accessible datasets for researchers to develop and test their algorithms. Second, we propose a graph neural network (GNN) based, scalable and real-time detector of FDIAs that efficiently combines model-driven and data-driven approaches by incorporating the inherent physical connections of modern ac power grids and exploiting the spatial correlations of the measurement. It is experimentally verified by comparing the proposed GNN-based detector with the currently available FDIA detectors in the literature that our algorithm outperforms the best available solutions by 3.14%, 4.25%, and 4.41% in $F$ 1 score for standard IEEE testbeds with 14, 118, and 300 buses, respectively.

1 October 2021 in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AUA. Umunnakwe
A. Umunnakwe
HHH. Huang
H. Huang
KOK. Oikonomou
K. Oikonomou
KDK.R. Davis
K.R. Davis

7 May 2015 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KDKatherine R. Davis
Katherine R. Davis
CDCharles M. Davis
Charles M. Davis
SZSaman A. Zonouz
Saman A. Zonouz
RBRakesh B. Bobba
Rakesh B. Bobba
RBRobin Berthier
Robin Berthier
PSPeter W. Sauer
Peter W. Sauer
The integration of cyber communications and control systems into the power grid infrastructure is widespread and has a profound impact on the operation, reliability, and efficiency of the grid. Cyber technologies allow for efficient management of the power system, but they may contain vulnerabilities that need to be managed. One important possible consequence is the introduction of cyber-induced or cyber-enabled disruptions of physical components. In this paper, we propose an online framework for assessing the operational reliability impacts due to threats to the cyber infrastructure. This framework is an important step toward addressing the critical challenge of understanding and analyzing complex cyber-physical systems at scale.

24 August 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ASAbhijeet Sahu
Abhijeet Sahu
ZMZeyu Mao
Zeyu Mao
PWPatrick Wlazlo
Patrick Wlazlo
HHHao Huang
Hao Huang
KDKatherine Davis
Katherine Davis
SZSaman Zonouz
Saman Zonouz
Modern power systems equipped with advanced communication infrastructure are cyber-physical in nature. The traditional approach of leveraging physical measurements for detecting cyber-induced physical contingencies is insufficient to reflect the accurate cyber-physical states. Moreover, deploying conventional rule-based and anomaly-based intrusion detection systems for cyberattack detection results in higher false positives. Hence, independent usage of detection tools of cyberattacks in cyber and physical sides has a limited capability. In this work, a mechanism to fuse real-time data from cyber and physical domains, to improve situational awareness of the whole system is developed. It is demonstrated how improved situational awareness can help reduce false positives in intrusion detection. This cyber and physical data fusion results in cyber-physical state space explosion which is addressed using different feature transformation and selection techniques. Our fusion engine is further integrated into a cyber-physical power system testbed as an application that collects cyber and power system telemetry from multiple sensors emulating real-world data sources found in a utility. These are synthesized into features for algorithms to detect cyber intrusions. Results are presented using the proposed data fusion application to infer False Data and Command Injection (FDI and FCI)-based Man-in-The-Middle attacks. Post collection, the data fusion application uses time-synchronized merge and extracts features. This is followed by pre-processing such as imputation, categorical encoding, and feature reduction, before training supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised learning models to evaluate the performance of the intrusion detection system. A major finding is the improvement of detection accuracy by fusion of features from cyber, security, and physical domains. Additionally, it is observed that the semi-supervised co-training technique performs at par with supervised learning methods with the proposed feature vector. The approach and toolset, as well as the dataset that is generated can be utilized to prevent threats such as false data or command injection attacks from being carried out by identifying cyber intrusions accurately.

13 January 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computational Intelligence
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ATAbdulrahman Takiddin
Abdulrahman Takiddin
RARachad Atat
Rachad Atat
Muhammad IsmailMuhammad Ismail
Muhammad Ismail
OBOsman Boyaci
Osman Boyaci
KDKatherine R. Davis
Katherine R. Davis
ESErchin Serpedin
Erchin Serpedin
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) pose a significant threat to smart power grids. Recent efforts have focused on developing machine learning (ML)-based defense strategies against such attacks. However, existing strategies offer limited detection performance since they (a) lack the capability of embedding the spatial aspects of the power system topology in the detection mechanism, (b) offer topology-specific detection that does not generalize well to practical systems with seasonal reconfigurations in their topology, or (c) offer detection based on only seen types of FDIAs present in the training set. Therefore, in this paper, we aim to develop a defense strategy that offers an improved generalization ability and detection performance against unseen attacks. Towards this objective, we propose a graph autoencoder (GAE)-based detection strategy that (a) captures spatio-temporal features of power systems, hence, offering improved detection performance, (b) is trained on comprehensive graphs reflecting various realizations of power system topologies, hence, offering better generalization abilities, and (c) works effectively against unseen FDIAs. The proposed detector is trained and tested on various topological configurations from 14, 39, and 118-bus systems offering detection rates (DRs) of 93.6%, 95.7%, and 99.1%, respectively, when tested against unseen FDIAs and unseen topologies. This presents an improvement of $11.5 - 30\%$ compared to existing ML-based strategies.