Rising rightwing populism (RWP) potentially constitutes an obstacle to climate change mitigation, as European RWP parties and politicians often espouse climate change skepticism and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, their party positions and issue stances have also become increasingly characterized by nationalism. Using European Social Survey data from 2016, we show that public attitudes consistent with nationalist ideology are clearly linked to voting for RWP parties and that people who hold these attitudes are more likely to be skeptical about climate change and to oppose policies that increase taxes on fossil fuels. With regard to policy attitudes, we find that nationalist ideology is more influential than traditional left-right political ideology, environmental values and political trust. The results also reveal substantial cross-national differences, as nationalist ideology is linked more closely to public views about climate change in Western European countries, where RWP parties with a nationalist rhetoric have had recent electoral successes.
This paper adds to our understanding of how people’s climate change concern and norms influence their leisure air travel. It does so by examining the roles of Norwegians’ beliefs about climate change and emissions from air travel, their felt responsibility to limit emissions (personal norm), and expectations and behaviors of friends and family (social norms) in such travel. A representative sample of Norwegians was surveyed in 2019 and 2020 (N = 2842), based on a framework combining institutional and social-psychological perspectives. Structural equation modeling of the data reveals that leisure air travel is habituated and part of a lifestyle, supported by social norms, self-enhancement values and urban residency. Personal norms for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from flying are beginning to emerge in Norway, but their effect on leisure air travel is small and only indirect. Our findings suggest the need for interventions to complement and potentially amplify the emerging moralization process and support an evolution of new habits and travel lifestyle to limit the emissions from leisure air travel substantially. The disruption of travel habits by the COVID-19 pandemic might ease such a process.
Scholars who study the failure of climate change policy in the United States tend to focus on the mechanics of denial and the coordinated efforts of political operatives, conservative think tanks, and partisan news outlets to cast doubt on what has become overwhelming scientific consensus. In contrast, we address a factor that has been understudied until now – the role of climate change advocacy in the U.S. Congress. Using quantitative text analysis on a corpus of floor speeches published in the Congressional Record between 1996 and 2015, we find notable differences in the language partisans use. Democrats communicate in ways that are message-based, emphasizing the weight of scientific evidence, while Republicans tend towards a softer, cue-based narrative based on anecdotes and storytelling. We end with a discussion of what climate change advocates can hope to accomplish through the ‘politics of talk,’ especially in an age of heightened polarization.
This study uncovers the dynamics that exist among key government officials working to address impacts of climate variability and change within a hostile socio-political setting. Through qualitative analysis of interviews with Oklahoma government officials, this study finds evidence of a climate change spiral of silence impacting key government decision-making processes through the suppression of climate change discourse and science. We argue that settings hostile toward climate action (where there is pervasive skepticism/denial of anthropogenic climate change and opposition to climate mitigations/adaptation policies) are primed for normative dynamics that reinforce a climate change spiral of silence.