This paper deals with issues concerning green subsidies of government and optimal decisions of a manufacture and dual-channel retailers in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain. Both a decentralized supply chain and a centralized supply chain are considered. Sufficient and necessary conditions for guaranteeing that the two supply chains run normally under government subsidies are proposed. For the decentralized supply chain, a three-layer model is constructed according to different priorities of the four participants. Both Bertrand game and Stackelberg game are involved. For the centralized supply chain, a two-layer model is given. Decision models of the government under a financial budget are developed for maximizing the green degree of each case. It is shown that the green degree of the product of the centralized supply chain is always higher than that of the decentralized supply chain. Meanwhile, the total profit of the centralized supply is also higher. Finally, a numerical illustration is presented to visualize the discussed models and make some supplements.
18 July 2020 in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
This paper considers optimal production and pricing strategies of energy-saving products in the presence of duopolistic manufacturers. First, we analyze the free competition case by a Bertrand game. A sufficient condition for guaranteeing the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution is proposed. The change rate of the benefit function of environment with regard to purchasing preference proportions is examined. Second, we investigate the case in the presence of energy-saving incentive. A two-layer decision model is constructed by considering the decision order of each participant. Optimal strategies between the two cases are compared. We provide theoretical foundations for the government to formulate policies of energy-saving incentive under a financial budget constraint. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the obtained conclusions and make some supplements.