This article contains various results on a class of nonmonotone, law-invariant risk functionals called the signed Choquet integrals. A functional characterization via comonotonic additivity is established along with some theoretical properties, including six equivalent conditions for a signed Choquet integral to be convex. We proceed to address two practical issues currently popular in risk management, namely robustness (continuity) issues and risk aggregation with dependence uncertainty, for signed Choquet integrals. Our results generalize in several directions those in the literature of risk functionals. From the results obtained in this paper, we see that many profound and elegant mathematical results in the theory of risk measures hold for the general class of signed Choquet integrals; thus, they do not rely on the assumption of monotonicity.
The class of distortion riskmetrics is defined through signed Choquet integrals, and it includes many classic risk measures, deviation measures, and other functionals in the literature of finance and actuarial science. We obtain characterization, finiteness, convexity, and continuity results on general model spaces, extending various results in the existing literature on distortion risk measures and signed Choquet integrals. This paper offers a comprehensive toolkit of theoretical results on distortion riskmetrics which are ready for use in applications.
Unlike classic risk sharing problems based on expected utilities or convex risk measures, quantile-based risk sharing games exhibit two special features. First, quantile-based risk measures (such as the Value-at-Risk) are often not convex, and second, they ignore some part of the distribution of the risk. These features create technical challenges in establishing a full characterization of optimal allocations, a question left unanswered in the literature. In this paper, we fully address the issues on the existence and the characterization of optimal allocations in quantile-based risk sharing games. It turns out that negative dependence plays an important role in the optimal allocations, in contrast to positive dependence appearing in classic risk sharing problems. As a by-product of our main finding, we obtain some results on the optimization of the Value-at-Risk and the Expected Shortfall.