1 January 2008 in Games and Economic Behavior
1 November 2009 in Games and Economic Behavior
1 March 2010 in SSRN Electronic Journal
MHMarjolein J. W. Harmsen - van Hout
Marjolein J. W. Harmsen - van Hout
BDBenedict G. C. Dellaert
We analyze the structure of bilateral communication links among consumers in virtual communities by a game-theoretic model of network formation. First, link specificity is incorporated, meaning that the more direct links somebody has to maintain with others, the less she is able to specify her attention per link, so that the value of her links decreases. Second, a distinction is made between the social and informational value from communication, where informational value is transferable via indirect links, whereas social value is not. We characterize the set of pairwise stable structures in the case with only social value to indicate the separate impact of link specificity and demonstrate that it includes a wide range of non-standard architectures under large link specificity and particular combinations of fully connected components under low link specificity. In the case with both social and informational value, the joint effect of link specificity and value transferability is shown to reduce the pairwise stable set to particular fragmented architectures under large link specificity or rather to the complete network under small link specificity.
1 May 2010 in SSRN Electronic Journal
MHMarjolein J. W. Harmsen - van Hout
Marjolein J. W. Harmsen - van Hout
BDBenedict G. C. Dellaert
Network formation constitutes an important part of many social and economic processes, but relatively little is known about how individuals make their linking decisions in networks. This article provides an experimental investigation of behavioral effects in individual decisions of network formation. Our findings demonstrate that the inherent complexity of the network setting makes individuals’ choices systematically less payoff-guided and also strongly reduces their social orientation. Furthermore, we show that specific network complexity features aggravate the former effect. These behavioral effects have important implications for researchers and managers working in areas that involve network formation.
1 October 2018 in Management Science
We consider a situation in which agents have mutual claims on each other, summarized in a liability matrix. Agents’ assets might be insufficient to satisfy their liabilities, leading to defaults. In case of default, bankruptcy rules are used to specify the way agents are going to be rationed. A clearing payment matrix is a payment matrix consistent with the prevailing bankruptcy rules that satisfies limited liability and priority of creditors. Since clearing payment matrices and the corresponding values of equity are not uniquely determined, we provide bounds on the possible levels equity can take. Unlike the existing literature, which studies centralized clearing procedures, we introduce a large class of decentralized clearing processes. We show the convergence of any such process in finitely many iterations to the least clearing payment matrix. When the unit of account is sufficiently small, all decentralized clearing processes lead essentially to the same value of equity as a centralized clearing procedure. As a policy implication, it is not necessary to collect and process all the sensitive data of all the agents simultaneously and run a centralized clearing procedure. This paper was accepted by Yinyu Ye, optimization.
27 February 2009 in Economic Theory
This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke–Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings–van den Elzen, Herings–Peeters, and McKelvey–Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general n-person games. We explain how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and dynamic games, and how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria.