Victoria V. Golikova

Victoria V. Golikova

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Victoria V. Golikova

HSE University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
7 March 2016 in Post-Soviet Affairs
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
VGVictoria Golikova
Victoria Golikova
BKBoris Kuznetsov
Boris Kuznetsov
This paper is focused on assessing the risk factors for Russian manufacturing firms posed by sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU, US, and other countries in 2014. While there is an extensive literature assessing the successes and failures of international sanctions on the economies of both those imposing and targeted by sanctions on a macroeconomic level, we are more interested in trying to understand the corporate response – i.e. which firms evaluate the introduction and increasing scale of economic sanctions as a threat to their corporate strategy, and their possible reactions aimed at adjusting to a changing environment due to the geopolitical shock. Our research, based on a recent survey of manufacturing companies, provides evidence that over the last decade Russian manufacturing firms have become much more integrated into the global economy than is commonly assumed, through foreign direct investment, foreign trade (including imports of both technological equipment and raw materials and components), international partnerships, and by extensively supplying foreign companies that operate in Russia. Considering the self-selection effect of the top-performing firms in terms of foreign trade, we can state that sanctions could prove most harmful not only for the targeted firms, but for the entire population of better-performing and globalized firms involved in foreign trade with the EU and Ukraine. Thus, the impact of the sanctions on the prospects of the Russian manufacturing sector may be very strong over the medium-to-long term.

5 December 2023 in Voprosy Ekonomiki
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YSYuri Simachev
Yuri Simachev
AYA. A. Yakovlev
A. A. Yakovlev
VGV. V. Golikova
V. V. Golikova
NGN. A. Gorodnyi
N. A. Gorodnyi
BKB. V. Kuznetsov
B. V. Kuznetsov
AFA. A. Fedyunina
A. A. Fedyunina
The article presents initial findings of a research project aimed at analyzing the impact of the “second wave” of sanctions in 2022 on the behavior of Russian companies, assesses their actions to adapt to the new conditions. This paper is based on survey data collected from managers of 1860 Russian manufacturing companies between August and November 2022. Despite the severity and scope of the sanctions, one third of the companies did not take adaptation measures, particularly local, technologically backward firms without innovative activity. On the whole, firms integrated into the global economy reacted more actively to new threats than those confined to the domestic market. We found significant variability in companies’ responses to the sanctions shock. Four basic quasistrategies of firms’ response are identified. The first one involved reducing current activities, employment, and investments. These actions were most common in industries integrated into global value chains, notably automotive industry and wood processing. The second strategy included simplifying products to reduce dependence on imports, finding new markets, and changing investment directions — typically seen in pharmaceutical firms. The third one consisted of altering supply channels for materials and components, and it was frequently adopted by manufacturers of rubber and plastic products. The fourth strategy focused on digitalization, developing new products, and increasing interaction with authorities. This was characteristic of industries whose markets have carved out niches due to the exits of major foreign players, in particular, manufacture of furniture. We highlight the following recommendations for the state anti-crisis policy: In 2022, the relative success of companies’ adaptation was associated with the implementation of “easy” import substitution. However, in the future there will be a need to prioritize support for the development of domestic technologies and increased access to knowledge. In conditions of high uncertainty, it is crucial to assist companies in building their own value chains, and predictability of government actions appears to be a significant factor in enhancing private initiative.

12 July 2021 in Voprosy Ekonomiki
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
VGV. V. Golikova
V. V. Golikova
BKB. V. Kuznetsov
B. V. Kuznetsov
The paper utilizes survey data of 2014 and 2018 for the analysis of import as one of the transmission channels of external shocks on the behavior of Russian industrial enterprises. The study aims to reveal strategies of importing under sanctions’ regime and evaluate the potential of import substitution. It demonstrates sustainability of business strategies with regard to importing and maintaining trends of high dependence on import equipment for technological modernization and competitiveness of products. The current scale of import substitution is modest, there is a lack of substantial transformation of geography of importing except radically diminished share of importers from Ukraine. Bi-probit econometric estimations that take into consideration firm’ simultaneous involvement in importing of interim products and equipment demonstrate that import of the former is critically important for the firms exporting to Europe, while the latter is associated with exporting to the members of the Customs’ Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

11 September 2017 in Foresight-Russia
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
VGVictoria Golikova
Victoria Golikova
BKBoris Kuznetsov
Boris Kuznetsov
The Russian manufacturing sector has an underdeveloped SME sector both in terms of employment and contributions to GDP in comparison with other economies, with evident signs of stagnation over the past few decades. However, little is known about the capacity of SME sector, i.e., the opportunities to grow and thus exploit the benefits from economies of scale. The paper attempts to estimate the impact of internal and external factors on a firm’s competitiveness in the context of optimal enterprise size. The main conclusion is that that the satisfaction of Russian SME managers has been increasing due to factors such as the sufficient supply of qualified personnel, modern infrastructure, developed partnerships, the expansion of the geographical scope of available markets and favorable institutional conditions for entrepreneurship. In contrast, serious constraints to SME growth in Russia discourage entrepreneurs and lead to poor decisions by managers such as exploiting shadow schemes, leaving the market or growth in the form of nominally independent firms under the informal “umbrella” of one owner. Formidable bureaucratic barriers and significant transactional costs increase the vulnerability of small businesses to administrative pressure. In order to survive and remain on the market, Russian companies have to adapt to the existing institutional environment, and must be larger compared to their counterparts in developed economies.

1 January 2023 in Russian Management Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ВГВиктория Владимировна Голикова
Виктория Владимировна Голикова
Goal: drawing from resource-based and institutional perspectives, the Russian sanctions/countersanctions are studied as a context of enduring economic-political turbulence for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) managers following external shock for Russian economy after first wave of sanctions in 2014 which affects firm performance through resource availability changes and (enforced) adjustments of strategic resources. Metodology: logit models are estimated for 972 SMEs within the sample of more than 1 700 manufacturing firms in Russia that are no direct targets of the sanctions. Cross sectional survey data collected in 2018 are used to evaluate the sanctions’ effect represented in the perceptions of SME managers about their firm performance. Findings: sanctions decrease the value of the firms’ resource combinations and force SMEs to bear adjustment costs. SMEs that are limited in their resource availability find it burdensome to derive adjustment strategies through resource re-allocations. All else equal, the technologically advanced SMEs perceive a deteriorated performance, while SMEs with domestic and international partnerships and young firms remain more optimistic. Counter sanctions helped to mitigate the burden of deteriorated business environment. Originality and contribution of the authors: the paper contributes to understanding of sanctions’ effect for firms that are not direct target of sanctions, which amends the existing macro-level and sectoral studies on the effects of economic sanctions with a more nuanced micro-level exploration taking into account heterogeneity of firms’ response to sanctions shock.

16 February 2017 in Post-Communist Economies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
VGVictoria Golikova
Victoria Golikova
BKBoris Kuznetsov
Boris Kuznetsov
MKMaxim Korotkov
Maxim Korotkov
AGAndrei Govorun
Andrei Govorun
The aim of this article is to conduct an empirical investigation and reveal which types of modernisation strategies and characteristics of regional institutional environment are likely to be associated with patterns of the performance of Russian manufacturing firms in 2007–2012. In addition to estimating the impact of ex-ante behaviour on the rate of sales growth, we use hierarchical cluster analysis to reveal the typical trajectories of firms’ sales growth. We find that the dynamic of sales for more than 90% of firms can be described by just two types of performance curve: (a) crisis decline with recovery and growth; and (b) crisis decline with weak recovery and stagnation. Firms that invested more prior to the crisis and implemented active restructuring were more likely to have positive post-crisis dynamics of sales. We find evidence that firms in the regions with lower levels of corruption (both administrative and everyday) were more likely to recover successfully after the crisis.