Ferdinand A. Gul

Ferdinand A. Gul

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Ferdinand A. Gul

Deakin University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 September 2017 in Accounting Horizons
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FGFerdinand A. Gul
Ferdinand A. Gul
MKMehdi Khedmati
Mehdi Khedmati
ELEdwin KiaYang Lim
Edwin KiaYang Lim
FNFarshid Navissi
Farshid Navissi
SYNOPSIS: This study examines whether the relationship between managerial ability and audit fees is conditional on financial distress. We find that higher managerial ability increases audit fees in financially distressed firms and decreases audit fees in non-distressed firms. We also observe that financially distressed firms with higher-ability managers display lower accrual quality and a higher likelihood of restatement. Moreover, higher-ability managers in distressed firms engage more in opportunistic financial reporting to concurrently maximize equity-based compensation and cope with debt refinancing pressures, which increases audit risks and results in greater audit fees. We confirm our results using a battery of sensitivity and additional analyses.

1 April 2018 in Accounting Horizons
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SGStephen X. Gong
Stephen X. Gong
FGFerdinand A. Gul
Ferdinand A. Gul
LSLiwei Shan
Liwei Shan
SYNOPSIS: This paper examines whether news coverage of client firms is associated with their audit fees. Using data from China listed firms during 2004–2013, we find that high coverage client firms are on average charged higher audit fees, irrespective of the media tone. This positive association is stronger for large auditors than for small auditors, and for bad news than for good news. The main results hold for both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs, and for both politically connected and non-connected firms. The results are robust after controlling for the effects of information asymmetry, auditor choice, internal corporate governance, and alternative measurements of the key variables. Overall, our evidence is supportive of the view that auditors assess high coverage clients as higher risk audits requiring greater audit efforts. We conclude that the financial news media plays a disciplining role in China through its potential to trigger reputational sanctions and regulatory action.

29 May 2020 in European Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMd Al Mamun
Md Al Mamun
BBBalasingham Balachandran
Balasingham Balachandran
HDHuu Nhan Duong
Huu Nhan Duong
FGFerdinand A Gul
Ferdinand A Gul
We find that firms with a top management counsel (TMC) have lower stock price crash risk than other firms. We further show that firms with a TMC issue more negative relative to positive earnings guidance and use more negative relative to positive words in their annual report filings, compared to firms without a TMC. TMCs are more effective in mitigating crash risk when they serve on the board. Our findings support the monitoring role of TMCs in mitigating bad news hoarding, which, in turn, contributes to the reduction in crash risk.

12 January 2021 in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
EWEffiezal Aswadi Abdul Wahab
Effiezal Aswadi Abdul Wahab
WGWillie. E. Gist
Willie. E. Gist
FGFerdinand A. Gul
Ferdinand A. Gul
MZMazlina Mat Zain
Mazlina Mat Zain
SUMMARY: This study examines the relationship between outsourced internal audits, nonaudit services, and audit fees. We use Malaysian data to show that client firms that outsource their internal auditing function (IAF) are associated with lower external audit fees than those with in-house IAF. Moreover, this negative relationship is significantly stronger for firms that purchase greater amounts of nonaudit services (NAS) from the auditor. The results suggest that an auditor who provides NAS to a client and thus earns additional overall revenue is willing to accept lower audit fees provided a high audit quality can be achieved through reliance on outsourced IAF. JEL Classifications: M42.

26 February 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
AVAnojan Vickneswaran
Anojan Vickneswaran
FGFerdinand Gul
Ferdinand Gul
RPRatna Paudyal
Ratna Paudyal
Auditing plays a central role in mitigating information asymmetry between corporate management and external stakeholders by enhancing the credibility, transparency, and timeliness of financial reporting. This study examines how the disclosure of Key Audit Matters (KAMs) relates to Audit Report Lag (ARL), viewing both as mechanisms that influence the effectiveness of information transmission. Using 5,919 firm-year observations from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy (2018–2023), we find that a greater number of KAMs is associated with longer ARL, suggesting that more complex risk disclosures require additional audit effort. However, this positive association is significantly weaker for Big 4 auditors, indicating that higher audit quality mitigates delays while preserving informational value. Moreover, this moderating effect is strongest in the UK’s common-law environment, where stronger investor protection enhances auditors’ capacity to reduce information asymmetry. Overall, the findings highlight how audit quality and legal institutions jointly shape the effectiveness and timeliness of KAM disclosures in capital markets.

2 August 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
ZCZhuo Cheng
Zhuo Cheng
JFJing Fang
Jing Fang
FGFerdinand Gul
Ferdinand Gul
SWStephanie Watson
Stephanie Watson
We analytically demonstrate that if providing non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients impairs auditor independence, the occurrence of more severe opportunistic accounting choices will more clearly reveal this impairment. Accounting fraud represents the most severe form of such choices. We document a positive relation between the ratio of NAS fees to total auditor fees and the incidence of accounting fraud. This relation is particularly pronounced for firms with stronger exante incentives to commit fraud, which also tend to purchase relatively more NAS from their auditors. In contrast, we find no significant relation between the NAS fee ratio and non-fraudrelated restatements. This null result aligns with our analytical prediction, as such restatements typically stem from unintentional misapplications of accounting standards. Finally, our results hold in a difference-indifferences analysis that exploits exogenous regulatory variation in NAS provision. Collectively, our results support the premise that providing NAS to audit clients compromises auditor independence.