19 February 2011 in The VLDB Journal
The typical workload in a database system consists of a mix of multiple queries of different types that run concurrently. Interactions among the different queries in a query mix can have a significant impact on database performance. Hence, optimizing database performance requires reasoning about query mixes rather than considering queries individually. Current database systems lack the ability to do such reasoning. We propose a new approach based on planning experiments and statistical modeling to capture the impact of query interactions. Our approach requires no prior assumptions about the internal workings of the database system or the nature and cause of query interactions, making it portable across systems. To demonstrate the potential of modeling and exploiting query interactions, we have developed a novel interaction-aware query scheduler for report-generation workloads. Our scheduler, called QShuffler, uses two query scheduling algorithms that leverage models of query interactions. The first algorithm is optimized for workloads where queries are submitted in large batches. The second algorithm targets workloads where queries arrive continuously, and scheduling decisions have to be made online. We report an experimental evaluation of QShuffler using TPC-H workloads running on IBM DB2. The evaluation shows that QShuffler, by modeling and exploiting query interactions, can consistently outperform (up to 4x) query schedulers in current database systems.
16 October 2020 in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
In this article, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all these voters strictly prefer the new committee to the existing one. Our main contribution is to extend this definition to stability of a distribution (or lottery) over committees. We consider two canonical voter preference models: the A pproval S et setting where each voter approves a set of candidates and prefers committees with larger intersection with this set; and the R anking R epresentative setting where each voter ranks committees based on how much she likes her favorite candidate in a committee. Our main result is to show that stable lotteries always exist for these canonical preference models. Interestingly, given preferences of voters over committees, the procedure for computing an approximately stable lottery is the same for both models and therefore extends to the setting where some voters have the former preference structure and others have the latter. Our existence proof uses the probabilistic method and a new large deviation inequality that may be of independent interest.