Shihao Huang

Shihao Huang

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Shihao Huang

School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 May 2025 in Production and Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SHShihao Huang
Shihao Huang
HXHang Xie
Hang Xie
YZYudi Zhang
Yudi Zhang
CCChun-Hung Chiu
Chun-Hung Chiu
Buy-online-pick-up-at-store (BOPS) is a prevalent strategy in omnichannel retailing. It is widely adopted by retailers, such as Target and Walmart, to attract customers via providing real-time information on product inventory and instant in-store pickup. This strategy is distinguished by its integration of online and offline channels, offering an exclusive service when compared to suppliers who operate solely online. Intuitively, BOPS enhances the competitive advantage of retailers, thereby countering suppliers’ encroachment in retailers’ online markets. However, our research provides the opposite results. We study the impact of BOPS on supplier encroachment by investigating a two-echelon supply chain involving a retailer considering BOPS implementation and a supplier contemplating online encroachment. Our research reveals that BOPS does not always prevent supplier encroachment; instead, it may trigger it. This occurs because the introduction of BOPS attracts customers who previously encountered stockout in physical stores, encouraging them to switch to the supplier’s online channel. This migration prompts the retailer to increase their fulfillment rate to better compete, which subsequently elevates the wholesale profit and benefits the supplier. Moreover, we explore five extensive models, including customer return, store-only customers, endogenous wholesale price, endogenous retail prices and cross-selling effect, with the results indicating that BOPS consistently facilitates supplier encroachment across all scenarios. In conclusion, our research suggests that BOPS might not be a prudent choice since it not only attracts supplier encroachment but also hurts retailers.

15 October 2025 in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YZYudi Zhang
Yudi Zhang
XWXiaojun Wang
Xiaojun Wang
BZBangdong Zhi
Bangdong Zhi
SHShihao Huang
Shihao Huang
CCChun-Hung Chiu
Chun-Hung Chiu

28 November 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SHShihao Huang
Shihao Huang
YZYudi Zhang
Yudi Zhang
KGKaijing Guo
Kaijing Guo
JYJiazi Yang
Jiazi Yang
Xiaojun WangXiaojun Wang
Xiaojun Wang
JZJiazi Zhang
Jiazi Zhang
As corporate social responsibility (CSR) gains increasing prominence in e-commerce, platforms are increasingly providing sales assistance to support their suppliers, such as JD's consumer-to-manufacturer initiatives, which help suppliers reduce their direct selling cost. However, the interplay between such sales assistance and the platform's CSR commitments remains poorly understood. While assistance can lower suppliers' operational cost, it may also reduce their profits in reselling channels, complicating the overall welfare implications. To systematically examine this interplay, we develop a game-theoretic model in which a CSR-oriented platform decides whether and how to assist a supplier, who subsequently chooses a distribution channel. Our results show that sales assistance benefits both parties only when the assistance is highly efficient and the commission rate is moderate. Otherwise, even well-intentioned assistance can harm the supplier due to high commission fees. Moreover, even if a platform with a high CSR level (i.e., one that pays more attention to suppliers' profits in addition to its own) exerts more assistance effort, a high commission rate can squeeze more profit, making sales assistance harmful to the supplier. Therefore, our study not only enriches the existing literature on channel structures by combining CSR and sales assistance but also provides valuable managerial insights. Specifically, it highlights that simply providing sales assistance is insufficient as it is necessary to simultaneously reduce commission fees for platform managers to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. Managerial relevance statement: This research provides crucial strategic guidance for engineering managers and policy makers navigating platform-driven supply chains. For engineering managers responsible for designing operational assistance systems, such as logistics optimization tools, supplier training modules, or data analytics platforms, our findings demonstrate that technical efficiency alone is insufficient. To create sustainable impact, these systems must be coupled with moderate commission structures and a nuanced understanding of channel selection dynamics. Specifically, managers should evaluate how assistance efficiency interacts with commission rates across different channel structures to avoid unintended consequences where platform support inadvertently diminishes supplier profitability. For policymakers and platform strategists, this study reveals that corporate social responsibility initiatives require careful calibration between operational support and financial pressures. Regulatory frameworks and platform governance models should encourage transparent pricing structures and balanced risk-sharing mechanisms. Wellintentioned assistance programs can inadvertently harm supplier viability when implementation overlooks these economic realities. Policy interventions could include establishing guidelines for fair commission practices or creating certification standards for effective supplier development programs. This paper also contributes to the following SDGs: SDG 8, SDG 9, SDG 12.