1 March 2022 in Operations Research
In a wide range of recommendation systems, self-interested individuals (“agents”) make decisions over time, using information revealed by other agents in the past, and producing information that may help agents in the future. Each agent would like to exploit the best action given the current information but would prefer the previous agents to explore various alternatives to collect information. A social planner, by means of a well-designed recommendation policy, can incentivize the agents to balance exploration and exploitation in order to maximize social welfare or some other objective. The recommendation policy can be modeled as a multiarmed bandit algorithm under Bayesian incentivecompatibility (BIC) constraints. This line of work has received considerable attention in the “economics and computation” community. Although in prior work, the planner interacts with a single agent at a time, the present paper allows the agents to affect one another directly in a shared environment. The agents now face two sources of uncertainty: what is the environment, and what would the other agents do? We focus on “explorable” actions: those that can be recommended by some BIC policy. We show how the principal can identify and explore all such actions.
7 February 2025 in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Most online platforms learn from interactions with users and engage in exploration : making potentially suboptimal choices to acquire new information. We study the interplay between exploration and competition : how such platforms balance the exploration for learning and competition for users. We consider a stylized duopoly in which two firms face the same multi-armed bandit problem. Users arrive one by one and choose between the two firms, so that each firm makes progress on its bandit problem only if it is chosen. We study whether competition incentivizes the adoption of better algorithms. We find that stark competition disincentivizes exploration, leading to low welfare. However, weaker competition incentivizes better exploration algorithms and increases welfare. We investigate two channels for weakening the competition: stochastic user choice models and a first-mover advantage. Our findings speak to the competition–innovation relationship and the first-mover advantage in the digital economy.
29 February 2020 in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
We study the problem of a seller dynamically pricing d distinct types of indivisible goods, when faced with the online arrival of unit-demand buyers drawn independently from an unknown distribution. The goods are not in limited supply, but can only be produced at a limited rate and are costly to produce. The seller observes only the bundle of goods purchased at each day, but nothing else about the buyer’s valuation function. Our main result is a dynamic pricing algorithm for optimizing welfare (including the seller’s cost of production) that runs in time and a number of rounds that are polynomial in d and the approximation parameter. We are able to do this despite the fact that (i) the price-response function is not continuous, and even its fractional relaxation is a non-concave function of the prices, and (ii) the welfare is not observable to the seller. We derive this result as an application of a general technique for optimizing welfare over divisible goods, which is of independent interest. When buyers have strongly concave, Hölder continuous valuation functions over d divisible goods, we give a general polynomial time dynamic pricing technique. We are able to apply this technique to the setting of unit-demand buyers despite the fact that in that setting the goods are not divisible, and the natural fractional relaxation of a unit-demand valuation is not strongly concave. To apply our general technique, we introduce a novel price randomization procedure that has the effect of implicitly inducing buyers to “regularize” their valuations with a strongly concave function. Finally, we also extend our results to a limited-supply setting in which the supply of each good cannot be replenished.
11 June 2024 in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
We consider the problem of decision-making using panel data, in which a decision-maker gets noisy, repeated measurements of multiple units (or agents). We consider the setup used in synthetic control methods, where there is a pre-intervention period when the principal observes the outcomes of each unit, after which the principal uses these observations to assign a treatment to each unit. Unlike this classical setting, we permit the units generating the panel data to be strategic, i.e. units may modify their pre-intervention outcomes in order to receive a more desirable intervention. The principal's goal is to design a strategyproof intervention policy, i.e. a policy that assigns units their utility-maximizing interventions despite their potential strategizing. We first identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which a strategyproof intervention policy exists, and provide a strategyproof mechanism with a simple closed form when one does exist. Along the way, we prove impossibility results for strategic multiclass classification, a natural extension of the well-studied (binary) strategic classification problem to the multiclass setting, which may be of independent interest. When there are two interventions, we establish that there always exists a strategyproof mechanism, and provide an algorithm for learning such a mechanism. For three or more interventions, we provide an algorithm for learning a strategyproof mechanism if there exists a sufficiently large gap in the principal's rewards between different interventions. Finally, we empirically evaluate our model using real-world panel data collected from product sales over 18 months. We find that our methods compare favorably to baselines which do not take strategic interactions into consideration, even in the presence of model misspecification.