1 January 2022 in Games and Economic Behavior
1 June 2024 in Management Science
Major banks around the world lost nearly $210 billion during the period of 2011–2016 due to operational risk events. To mitigate the severe consequences that can arise from such events, the Basel Regulatory Committee has mandated that financial institutions worldwide conduct inspections on operational risk. In light of the importance of operational risk and its current regulation in the industry, this paper proposes a continuous-time principal-agent model that explores the optimal inspection policy of a financial firm (principal) and the effort of its employees (agent) to reduce the occurrence of risk events. First, we characterize the optimal inspection strategy under two commonly used policies in practice, namely random and periodic policies. This characterization reveals the conditions for two different modes of inspection (effort inducement and error correction), as well as the nuanced interactions among the inspection frequency, the penalty charged for errors, and the wage paid to employees. Next, by comparing random and periodic policies, we find that the random policy outperforms the periodic policy if and only if the inspection cost is high. Furthermore, we propose a hybrid policy that strictly dominates the random policy and weakly dominates the periodic policy, suggesting that a proper reduction of the random element in the inspection policy, in the manner of our proposed hybrid policy, can always improve its performance. Finally, we examine the complete information benchmark (without moral hazard), supplemental mitigation strategies, and numerical studies to provide further insights and show the robustness of our main findings. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.00322 .
1 March 2024 in Operations Research
The free rider problem is widely observed in investments in the common good. For example, if Best Buy offers corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, such as recycling, tech training, and supplier audit, at its own expense, other firms in the industry can benefit from these programs at no cost (i.e., they become the free riders). Such a free rider effect often manifests itself as a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which potential investors unnecessarily delay their investments. The article “Investment in the common good: Free rider effect and the stability of mixed strategy equilibria” finds that recurring investment opportunities can be a major driver of delays in investment in the common good. It also shows that sufficient heterogeneity in investment cost among potential investors can alleviate the free rider effect. Therefore, the policy makers may try to facilitate investments in public goods (e.g., CSR activities) through some form of selective benefits to potential investors.
31 January 2023 in Decision Sciences
1 June 2023 in Decision Analysis