Vikram Krishnamurthy

Vikram Krishnamurthy

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Vikram Krishnamurthy

School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

36Years (1991-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 December 1991 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
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SCShin-Ho Chung
Shin-Ho Chung
VKVikram Krishnamurthy
Vikram Krishnamurthy
JMJ. B. Moore
J. B. Moore
Techniques for characterizing very small single-channel currents buried in background noise are described and tested on simulated data to give confidence when applied to real data. Single channel currents are represented as a discrete-time, finite-state, homogeneous, Markov process, and the noise that obscures the signal is assumed to be white and Gaussian. The various signal model parameters, such as the Markov state levels and transition probabilities, are unknown. In addition to white Gaussian noise the signal can be corrupted by deterministic interferences of known form but unknown parameters, such as the sinusoidal disturbance stemming from AC interference and a drift of the base line owing to a slow development of liquid-junction potentials. To characterize the signal buried in such stochastic and deterministic interferences, the problem is first formulated in the framework of a Hidden Markov Model and then the Expectation Maximization algorithm is applied to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters (state levels, transition probabilities), signals, and the parameters of the deterministic disturbances. . Using fictitious channel currents embedded in the idealized noise, we first show that the signal processing technique is capable of characterizing the signal characteristics quite accurately even when the amplitude of currents is as small as 5-10 fA. The statistics of the signal estimated from the processing technique include the amplitude, mean open and closed duration, open-time and closed-time histograms, probability of dwell-time and the transition probability matrix. With a periodic interference composed, for example, of 50 Hz and 100 Hz components, or a linear drift of the baseline added to the segment containing channel currents and white noise, the parameters of the deterministic interference, such as the amplitude and phase of the sinusoidal wave, or the rate of linear drift, as well as all the relevant statistics of the signal, are accurately estimated with the algorithm we propose. Also, if the frequencies of the periodic interference are unknown, they can be accurately estimated. Finally, we provide a technique by which channel currents originating from the sum of two or more independent single channels are decomposed so that each process can be separately characterized. This process is also formulated as a Hidden Markov Model problem and solved by applying the Expectation Maximization algorithm. The scheme relies on the fact that the transition matrix of the summed Markov process can be construed as a tensor product of the transition matrices of individual processes.

3 August 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
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VKVikram Krishnamurthy
Vikram Krishnamurthy
DADaniel Angley
Daniel Angley
RERobin J. Evans
Robin J. Evans
William MoranWilliam Moran
William Moran
We consider an inverse reinforcement learning problem involving us versus an enemy radar equipped with a Bayesian tracker. By observing the emissions of the enemy radar, how can we identify if the radar is cognitive (constrained utility maximizer) Given the observed sequence of actions taken by the enemy's radar, we consider three problems: (i) Are the enemy radar's actions (waveform choice, beam scheduling) consistent with constrained utility maximization If so how can we estimate the cognitive radar's utility function that is consistent with its actions. We formulate and solve the problem in terms of the spectra (eigenvalues) of the state and observation noise covariance matrices, and the algebraic Riccati equation. (ii) How to construct a statistical test for detecting a cognitive radar (constrained utility maximization) when we observe the radar's actions in noise or the radar observes our probe signal in noise We propose a statistical detector with a tight Type-II error bound. (iii) How can we optimally probe (interrogate) the enemy's radar by choosing our state to minimize the Type-II error of detecting if the radar is deploying an economic rational strategy, subject to a constraint on the Type-I detection error We present a stochastic optimization algorithm to optimize our probe signal. The main analysis framework used in this paper is that of revealed preferences from microeconomics.

28 November 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
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VKVikram Krishnamurthy
Vikram Krishnamurthy
MRMuralidhar Rangaswamy
Muralidhar Rangaswamy
We consider an adversarial Bayesian signal processing problem involving “us” and an “adversary”. The adversary observes our state in noise; updates its posterior distribution of the state and then chooses an action based on this posterior. Given knowledge of “our” state and sequence of adversary's actions observed in noise, we consider three problems: (i) How can the adversary's posterior distribution be estimated? Estimating the posterior is an inverse filtering problem involving a random measure - we formulate and solve several versions of this problem in a Bayesian setting. (ii) How can the adversary's observation likelihood be estimated? This tells us how accurate the adversary's sensors are. We compute the maximum likelihood estimator for the adversary's observation likelihood given our measurements of the adversary's actions where the adversary's actions are in response to estimating our state. (iii) How can the state be chosen by us to minimize the covariance of the estimate of the adversary's observation likelihood? “Our” state can be viewed as a probe signal which causes the adversary to act; so choosing the optimal state sequence is an input design problem. The above questions are motivated by the design of counter-autonomous systems: given measurements of the actions of a sophisticated autonomous adversary, how can our counter-autonomous system estimate the underlying belief of the adversary, predict future actions and therefore guard against these actions.

21 June 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
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VKVikram Krishnamurthy
Vikram Krishnamurthy
KPKunal Pattanayak
Kunal Pattanayak
SGSandeep Gogineni
Sandeep Gogineni
BKBosung Kang
Bosung Kang
MRMuralidhar Rangaswamy
Muralidhar Rangaswamy
This article considers three interrelated adversarial inference problems involving cognitive radars. We first discuss inverse tracking of the radar to estimate the adversary's estimate of us based on the radar's actions and calibrate the radar's sensing accuracy. Second, using revealed preference from microeconomics, we formulate a nonparametric test to identify if the cognitive radar is a constrained utility maximizer with signal processing constraints. We consider two radar functionalities, namely, beam allocation and waveform design, with respect to which the cognitive radar is assumed to maximize its utility and construct a set-valued estimator for the radar's utility function. Finally, we discuss how to engineer interference at the physical layer level to confuse the radar that forces it to change its transmit waveform. The levels of abstraction range from smart interference design based on Wiener filters (at the pulse/waveform level), inverse Kalman filters at the tracking level, and revealed preferences for identifying utility maximization at the systems level.

24 August 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
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RMRobert Mattila
Robert Mattila
CRCristian R. Rojas
Cristian R. Rojas
VKVikram Krishnamurthy
Vikram Krishnamurthy
BWBo Wahlberg
Bo Wahlberg
Bayesian filtering deals with computing the posterior distribution of the state of a stochastic dynamic system given noisy observations. In this paper, motivated by applications in counter-adversarial autonomous systems, we consider the following inverse filtering problem: Given a sequence of posterior distributions from a Bayesian filter, what can be inferred about the transition kernel of the state, the observation likelihoods of the sensor and the measured observations? For finite-state Markov chains observed in noise (hidden Markov models), we show that a least-squares fit for estimating the parameters and observations amounts to a combinatorial optimization problem with non-convex objective. Instead, by exploiting the algebraic structure of the corresponding Bayesian filter, we propose an algorithm based on convex optimization for reconstructing the transition kernel, the observation likelihoods and the observations. We discuss and derive conditions for identifiability. As an application of our results, we demonstrate the design of a counter-adversarial autonomous system: By observing the actions of an autonomous enemy, we estimate the accuracy of its sensors and the observations it has received. The proposed algorithms are illustrated via several numerical examples.

1 February 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
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AGAnurag Gupta
Anurag Gupta
VKVikram Krishnamurthy
Vikram Krishnamurthy
Electronic countermeasures (ECMs) against a radar are actions taken by an adversarial jammer to mitigate the effective utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum by the radar. On the other hand, electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCMs) are actions taken by the radar to mitigate the impact of ECMs so that the radar can continue to operate effectively. The main idea of this article is to show that ECCMs involving a radar and a jammer can be formulated as a principal–agent problem (PAP)—a problem widely studied in microeconomics. With the radar as the principal and the jammer as the agent, we design a PAP to optimize the radar’s ECCM strategy in the presence of a jammer. The radar seeks to optimally trade off the signal-to-noise ratio of the target measurement with the measurement cost: cost for generating radiation power for the pulse to probe the target. We show that for a suitable choice of utility functions, the PAP is a convex optimization problem. Furthermore, we analyze the structure of the PAP and provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal solution is an increasing function of the jamming power observed by the radar; this enables computation of the radar’s optimal ECCM within the class of increasing affine functions at a low computation cost. Finally, we illustrate the PAP formulation of the radar’s ECCM problem via numerical simulations. We also use simulations to study a radar’s ECCM problem, wherein the radar and the jammer have mismatched information.