Research Summary: Digital firms tend to be both narrow in their vertical scope and large in their scale. We explain this phenomenon through a theory about how attributes of firms' resource bundles impact their scale and specialization. We posit that highly scalable resource bundles entail significant opportunity costs of integration (vs. outsourcing), which simultaneously drive “hyperspecialization” and “hyperscaling” in digital firms. Using descriptive theory and a formal model, we develop several propositions that align with observed features of digital businesses. We offer a parsimonious modeling framework for resource‐based theorizing about highly scalable digital firms, shed light on the phenomenon of digital scaling, and provide insights into the far‐reaching ways that technology‐enabled resources are reshaping firms in the digital economy. Managerial Summary: Why are leading firms in the digital economy simultaneously larger and more specialized than those in the industrial age? Our research explains this phenomenon as being driven by the scalability of digital resources—that is, their capacity to create more value at larger scales when used intensively in a focal activity. We clarify what digital scalability means, and highlight trade‐offs created by the opportunity costs of not employing scalable digital resources intensively. Digital firms should outsource complementary activities to avoid diverting resources away from their scalable core, and to enhance their ability to grow exponentially. Although resource fungibility and outsourcing costs mitigate these imperatives, digital firms may nonetheless find it profitable to remain specialized despite the challenges of managing outsourcing and sharing value with complementors.
This paper proposes a charging management of electric vehicles (EVs) that considers time anxieties and different behaviors of EV customers. The time anxiety concept is newly presented to address some uncertain events that may happen meanwhile charging of EVs, affect their charging patterns, and prevent them from meeting their energy demands. The working principle of the concept relies on prioritizing the charging before the event occurrences, and thus changing the EV charging patterns. Based on this concept, four different EV customer behaviors are proposed and their influences are investigated. The EV charging problem is formulated as a generalized Nash equilibrium game, in which each EV minimizes its charging cost given its charging requirements and the charging facility constraints. The solution is developed on the basis of receding horizon optimization and reached iteratively in a distributed manner. Detailed simulation and comparison results are introduced to verify the effectiveness of the proposed charging management with the different time-anxiety-based EV customer behaviors.
In this study, we examine the nature of Schumpeterian competition between entrants and incumbents. We argue that incumbents may respond to the threat of entry by either attacking the entrant or trying to learn from it, and that entrants, in turn, may react by either reciprocating the incumbent’s advances or retreating from it. Putting these competitive choices together, we develop a framework of four distinct potential scenarios of Schumpeterian competition. In particular, we emphasize a scenario we term creative divergence, wherein incumbents try to learn from entrants and build on their technologies, but their investments to do so cause entrants to retreat, resulting in diminishing returns to learning investments by incumbents. Exploratory analyses of the U.S. cardiovascular medical device industry find patterns consistent with the creative divergence scenario, with incumbent knowledge investments helping them to learn from entrants, but these learning benefits being undermined as entrants move away from incumbents.The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1264 .